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Abstract
This essay provides a historic analysis on the evolution of the issue of human rights in 
U.S.-China relations since the Cold War. First chapter lays the ground for the historic 
analysis of the evolution of human rights in U.S.-China relations since the Cold War. Sec-
ond chapter focuses on the G.H.W.Bush administration’s management of the bilateral rela-
tionship after the terrible incident of 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. The third part analyses 
in detail the full story of the debacle of the linkage between China’s Most-Favoured-Nation 
status and its human rights conditions and the subsequent passage of Permanent Normal 
Trade Relations status for China. The final chapter focuses on the continuous process of 
dissolution of human rights under the two most recent presidencies, G.W.Bush and Oba-
ma. It concludes that human rights will remain on the margins of the bilateral relationship 
but will prevail as China becomes ever more integrated into the international community.
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Introduction
On the stage of the 2016 G-20 summit in the pristine city of Hangzhou, the latest worldly 
event hosted by the Communist government of China, President Obama and President Xi 
Jinping greeted each other with adequate diplomatic etiquette and restraint warmth. Off-
stage, however, was quite another less harmonious scenario. On the one hand, Western 
media was obligated to focus their attention not only on the latest world affairs and in-
ternational economy but also on the host’s human rights conditions and their own national 
policy toward China. On the other hand, the Chinese government was trying its best to lim-
it the impact of possible condemnations and censoring sensitive elements online if neces-
sary. In particular, the topic of “how does the U.S. president press China on human rights 
improvements” has become a reoccurring top story in the U.S. media, whenever and wher-
ever the summits of both leaders were held. This time in Hangzhou, thanks to the active 
precautions of the Chinese government and the overly pressing matters in world affairs, 
such as the continuing conflict in Syria and the impact of Brexit, human rights has barely 
been mentioned by the U.S. president on his stay in China. Such a less vocal approach to 
China adopted by the president will certainly attract criticisms from the media, academics, 
activists and non-governmental organisations back home. This pattern is so predictable 
that it can be used on almost all kinds  of summit meetings between the leaders from the 
United States and China. For example, commenting on President Obama’s silence on Chi-
na’s human rights record, Sophie Richardson, the China director from the Human Rights 
Watch, has questioned that, “[w]hy not threaten sanctions, cut out the pointless pomp or 
visibly align with peaceful critics of the government? On other diplomatic, economic and 
security issues, governments recognise and use these points of leverage. Why not on hu-
man rights?” (The New York Times, 2016) Oh dear, what a great pulse of questions! In re-
lation to U.S.-China relationship, these are staple questions from her organisation and they 
Page    of  5 119
never tired of asking. So why does the United States not threaten sanctions against China 
on behalf of human rights? And why does China always be the subject of criticism when it 
comes into contact with the United States? Most importantly, how does the issue of human 
rights evolve into such a position in the U.S.-China relationship? This paper will try to an-
swer those questions in the context of history.
There are four main chapters in this essay. First chapter lays the ground for the historic 
analysis of the evolution of human rights in U.S.-China relations since the Cold War. Sec-
ond chapter focuses on the G.H.W.Bush administration’s management of the bilateral rela-
tionship after the terrible incident of 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. The third part analyses 
in detail the full story of the debacle of the linkage between China’s Most-Favoured-Nation 
status and its human rights conditions and the subsequent passage of Permanent Normal 
Trade Relations status for China. The final chapter focuses on the continuous process of 
dissolution of human rights under the two most recent presidencies, G.W.Bush and Oba-
ma.
Literature Review and Methodology
A huge amount has already been written about Human Rights and U.S. foreign policy in general. 
As the research question of this thesis entails that it specifically focuses on China and U.S. human 
rights policy. However, whenever this whole research has been brought up, the intertwined and 
tangled concepts of human rights, U.S. foreign policy and U.S.-China relations are particularly dif-
ficult to start with. Thus, it would be both useful and necessary to explore what has already been 
contributed to each theoretical segments in this literature review.  
The research question can be dissected into three major topic areas: 1) Human Rights in 
US foreign policy; 2) the US China Policy; and 3) Human Rights issues in the US-China re-
lations. Despite the richness of literature in each of the three subject areas, they remain 
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mostly fragmented and lack specific researches that thread all three subjects in a coherent 
manner and pinpoint the evolution of human rights in the U.S. China Policy.  
The contradictory tendencies among those literatures are relatively easy to identify. On the 
one hand, it is commonly agreed that human rights has been enshrined in a principle place 
in the American foreign policy since the Carter administration. It is not only a crucial part 
of the American identity, but also prominent in forming the ‘Grand Strategy’ for advancing 
the U.S. interests overseas. On the other hand, once it comes to the discussions on U.S. 
China Policy, many scholars, such as (Lawrence et al., 2012: 16-21), placed their studies of 
human rights issues in the end, after the more ‘important’ aspects of security, trade, etc., 
have been thoroughly examined. And yet, most of them recognise that human rights is the 
major area for potentially serious disputes in the U.S.-China relationship. Perhaps one 
reason is that the US-China relations embrace a wide range of complex issues such as se-
curity and economics, human rights, although still a vital area of interest, is just one of the 
subfields which produces much less concrete policy outcomes and, therefore, requires less 
focus on the problem.  
This tendency can be seen as one of the legacies of Cold War realist ideology. And its roots 
could be traced back to some of the modern foundations of realism. From George Kennan’s 
search for the foundations of “American Diplomacy” (2012) to Hans Morgenthau’s early 
lecture on “Human Rights and Foreign Policy” within the confines of America, human 
rights did not establish itself as a prominent ‘concern’ in U.S. foreign policy at the begin-
ning. “[H]uman rights is only one and not the most important one, and the United States is 
incapable of consistently following the path of the defense of human rights without man-
euvering itself into a Quixotic position.” (Morgenthau, 1979: 6) The collection edited by 
Peter Brown and Douglas MacLean (1979) summarized the sentiment of human rights 
movement under Carter administration with a special look on the legal perspective, from 
foreign assistance aid to intervention. Relating to this legal trend is David Forsythe’s 
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(1988) devoted work on Congress and Human Rights Legislation. Some later works not 
only continued to discuss the ‘old’ issues of consistency of human rights application in U.S. 
foreign policy, but paid more attentions to new issues such as terrorism. (Hancock, 2007 
and Mertus, 2008) On the other hand, on a more critical part of the literature, there are 
many works have been contributed to the debate of the US hegemonic position and its per-
ception of human rights, such like Michael Ignatieff’s  (2005) work on American Excep-
tionalism and Tony Evans  (1996) analysis on US hegemony and the project of Universal 
Human Rights. They agrees that the US is exceptional primarily because  it occupies an ex-
treme position of hegemon. (Moravscik, 2005; Hoffmann, 2005)
However, to put less emphasis on human rights in comparison with other more important 
issues does not mean that it should be treated as an add-on factor attached to the study of 
U.S. China Policy, which enables the authors to claim greater comprehensiveness in his ar-
guments. Without acknowledging the problem of human rights, an analysis of the U.S. 
China Policy would appear much less convincing in delivering its arguments and recom-
mendations. Since China has increasingly become the topic of the world in recent years, 
the international scrutiny on its human rights practices has also expanded accordingly. 
Bearing the burden of 1989 crackdown and its legacy, China’s relations with most coun-
tries of the so-called ‘free world’ have long been disturbed by the issue of human rights. As 
the ‘leader’ of this free group, the US was and is expected by many to be the most effective 
force in pressing on China to make progress in its human rights conditions. (Foot, 2000: 
265-6) Therefore, the actions taken by the US government in responding to China’s human 
rights require detailed investigations. The immense body of literatures contributed to the 
subject of U.S. relations with China can be categorised into three main areas.
First area of U.S.-China literature focuses on the compatibility of human rights in U.S. for-
eign policy. The fundamental question of whether human rights is a legitimate concern for 
nation’s foreign policy has been discussed by generations of scholars. R.J.Vincent famously 
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claimed in his book Foreign Policy and Human Rights that, “there is no obvious connec-
tion between human rights and foreign policy.” (1986: 1) Donnelly (2003) devoted two ex-
cellent chapters on ‘Human Rights and Foreign Policy’ and ‘The Priority of National Ac-
tion’ in his influential book of Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. He rightly 
observed that the issue of human rights is largely a matter of national, not international, 
action. (ibid: 173) This position has also been echoed by John Mearsheimer. He argued 
that those people who wanted decisive international actions for human rights were ‘naively 
optimistic’. (Mearsheimer, 1992: 212) Build on this foundation, Andrew Vincent carefully 
but controversially argued that human rights, as integral to the state tradition, must be 
seen as ‘intrinsically political’. (Vincent, 2010: 2) In this regard, human rights is definitely 
a legitimate concern of foreign policy. It certainly has established itself a prominent place 
in the American Foreign Policy. Donnelly (1999: 76-8) offered a short but precise analysis 
on the construction of human rights policy under the Carter Administration in Dunne and 
Wheeler’s (1999) collection on Human Rights in Global Politics. A detailed analysis on the 
principles and rationale of Reagan’s human rights policy has been done by Carleton and 
Stohl (1985). Kenneth Roth, the Executive Director of Human Rights Watch, has published 
a very cautious article about Obama’s approach to human rights and rightly predicted it 
can only be seen as ‘an incomplete reversal’ of the previous Bush administration’s ap-
proach. (Roth, 2010) On the other hand, in his latest article on the Obama administration, 
David Forsythe (2011) proposed a category of ‘muddling through’ in analysing the incon-
sistency of the U.S. human rights policy. However, he found an evident continuity of the 
Obama administration’s human rights policy with most other modern administrations. 
(ibid: 787-8) Nevertheless, most have agreed that human rights will continue to occupy a 
crucial place in the American foreign policy under Obama.
Second category of literature specifies its focus on the US China Policy. Harry Harding’s A 
Fragile Relationship (1992) and Rosemary Foot’s The Practice of Power (1995) offered us 
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informative and authoritative history account of the US-China relations since 1949. Many 
individual studies have been done by various scholars in investigation the making of US 
China Policy. Jean Garrison (2005) focused on the impact of the internal decision making 
process on both the continuity and change in US China Policy from Nixon to George W. 
Bush. With a special emphasis on the influence of interest groups, Sutter (1998) provided 
the most informative analysis on the issue of China’s MFN status debate and Taiwan Crisis 
1995-6. He maintained a cautiously optimistic view on the future of the US-China relation-
ship. (ibid: 8) Christensen (2009) gave a persuasive account from a former diplomat’s po-
sition by suggesting the Obama Administration should do more in shaping China’s choice 
of policy.
A special attention is required for two books. One is the book written by David Lampton 
(2001), “Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000”. It is a 
very comprehensive and solid historical analysis on the crucial period after the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown. This essay benefited so much from Lampton’s precise and strong 
analysis on the flow of events during that troubling period. As a student who was born af-
ter this period, this book filled the gap of memory with upmost richness of materials. Sec-
ond one is a collation edited by Myers, Oksenberg and Shambaugh “Making China Policy: 
Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administration” (2001). The collection delivered its 
analysis on the making of China policy in two ways. Ross and Tucker focused their re-
searches in the executive branch. Sutter and Dumbaugh concentrated on the role of Con-
gress in China policymaking. Robert Ross examined the rationale of Bush’s defence of the 
strategy of engagement after Tiananmen crisis and claimed US interests depend on efforts 
by the US to develop a realistic and effective China policy. (Ross, 2001: 39-40) Tucker 
echoed this conclusion in her examination of the Clinton’s China Policy. (Tucker, 2001: 69-
70) On the other hand, Sutter argued that the continued China-bashing attitude of Con-
gress acts as ‘a drag on forward movement’ in the bilateral relationship. (Sutter, 2001: 79) 
Page    of  10 119
Dumbaugh (2001:143) concluded that the diversification of interest groups and other non-
governmental players will be ‘problematic’ for US China policymaking. This collection pro-
vides this research with rich grounds on the understanding of the Executive-Congressional 
relations in the making of China policy. 
The third category of literature is studies specifically focused on human rights issues in 
US-China relations. The most comprehensive and authoritative works are contributed by 
Rosemary Foot, “Rights Beyond Borders: the Global Community and The Struggle over 
Human Rights in China” (2000), “China and the Tiananmen Bloodshed of June 
1989” (2012), “Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism in America’s Asia Policy” (2004). 
The historical account of the struggle over human rights between China and the in-
ternational community since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown has been very well docu-
mented in many prominent works. By focusing on selected non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs), some national governments and the United Nations human rights institu-
tions, Foot (2000) gave a comprehensive analysis into the ‘action-inaction’ dilemmas faced 
by those international actors in their dealings with China from pre-1989 period to 1999. At 
the same time, she also pointed out the paradoxical situation experienced by the Chinese 
government in their responses to the international community’s attention on its human 
rights conditions. By adhering to international human rights norms defined in the Univer-
sal Declaration and the two subsequent Covenants, the Chinese government ensured its 
political legitimacy and the security of the state in both the domestic and international 
realms. “Yet participation in the rights regime poses particular threats to an authoritarian 
government because of the domestic political transformation that full adherence to in-
ternational standards entails.” (ibid: 2) Despite these challenges, Foot (ibid: 26 and 260) 
concluded that the struggle over China’s human rights by international community helps 
to keep China firmly engaged with the international human rights regimes and yet, full 
domestic implementation  and deeper internalisation of the core norms is still to come. 
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Other literatures on China’s perspective are also worth mentioning. Notably David Sham-
baugh’s latest book “China Goes Global: The Partial Power” (2013) provides a detailed in-
vestigation on almost all aspect of China’s power. He argues  (ibid: 316) that China is far 
less powerful than many think and unable to surpass the US in the near future. 
The final part of the literature related to the research question which also requires a special 
look is the overarching idea of ‘human rights’ itself. Ever since my undergraduate years, 
human rights has attracted a large chunk of my academic attention. For example, my dis-
sertation is about the exploration of the universality of human rights idea with a specific 
case study focuses on China’s historical perception of human rights. (Article not published) 
This particularly strong interest in human rights has been the ultimate motivating factor in 
generating this research project, but with a small twist. This research based itself more in 
the realm of U.S. foreign policy studies rather than human rights studies. However, the key 
debates about the idea of human rights have to be mentioned here. A focal point of the 
conceptual conflict between the U.S. and China on human rights is on the universality of 
the idea. 
There are a variety of works on the debate over the universality of human rights and the 
very foundation of this universal standard. In Baehr’s definition, human rights are interna-
tionally agreed values, standards or rules regulating the conduct of states towards their 
own citizens and towards non-citizens.(1999:1) Although this rather compromising defini-
tion of human rights may not challenged by many nowadays, the increasing inconsistency 
between words and practices on human rights protection worldwide compels many to re-
address the fundamental issues of human rights. 
For liberals like Donnelly, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being. 
And they are ‘inalienable’ rights: “one cannot stop being human being, and thus cannot 
stop having these rights.” (Donnelly, 1999: 80) However, this simple and easy understand-
ing of human rights does not conclude the universality debate by itself. In political reality, 
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human rights are held with respect to and exercised against the sovereign nation-state. Be-
cause the state is the only bearer of those standards, for Donnelly, the central probléma-
tique of contemporary human rights is that states do not always uphold these standards. 
Although the centrality of nation-state as the bearer of duties correlative to internationally 
recognised human rights is not going to shift any time soon, with compelling evidence of 
normative consensus against “contemporary manifestations of ethnic privilege, xenopho-
bic nationalism and politicised religious fundamentalism” (ibid: 96), universal human 
rights can establish itself as pressurising force about the proper way to organise social and 
political relations in the contemporary international society. 
For others, their position on universal human rights cannot be more different. Such as 
R.J.Vincent stated that there is no universal morality and there are also no universal val-
ues. (Vincent, 1986:38) Because the history of the world is the story of the plurality of cul-
tures and these cultures produce their own values. To consider this point in an extreme 
sense, the attempt to assert the universality of so called ‘human rights’ is “a more or less 
well-disguised version of the imperial doctrine of trying to make the values of a particular 
culture general.” (ibid) Unsurprisingly, as many strong cultural relativists claimed, the 
theory of human rights is a doctrine specific to the west, or moreover, “a doctrine that is all 
the insidious for the way in which it licenses its own imposition upon the whole of humani-
ty.” (Jones, 2001:29) Undoubtedly, the doctrine of human rights is a western idea. Because 
the references to the status of person and to human dignity show how closely the idea of 
right is connected to that of political individualism of the ‘West’. (Vincent, 1986:17) With 
such position in mind, for relativists in general, no way of life is objectively the best or suits 
all, “that the good life cannot be defined independently of the character of the individuals 
involved, and that moral beliefs and practices cannot be detached from wider way of life 
and abstractly judged and graded.” (Parekh, 1999: 133) One particular group of cultural 
relativism is the Asian Values which emphasise more on collectivism and economic devel-
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opment rather than liberal individualism. Although the main advocates in this group are 
smaller economies in Asia, the argument has usually been associated with much bigger re-
gional players such as China. The arguments on sovereignty and economic development 
are commonly reflected in Chinese foreign policy throughout the years since the end of the 
Second World War. It is usually sited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that sovereignty is 
the foundation and basic guarantee of human rights. (Chinese Foreign Ministry website) It 
has also been commonly recognised that systematic infringements of internationally 
recognised human rights are necessary, and thus justifiable, to achieve rapid economic de-
velopment. (Donnelly, 2003: 109) On a much deeper level, it comes down to the confucian 
relation between individuals and society, which is of “an order of importance secondary to 
family-based community system which differentiated between roles and abilities.” (Kent, 
1993: 30-1) Although those claims have been contested by scholars , such as Parekh (1999: 
133) and Booth (1999: 49-51), as “wholly or partially false” or “empirically falsifying” and 
“ethnically flawed”, it continues to have a strong appeal to many Asian polities and to cul-
tural relativist argument in general. 
With the complexity of the debates about human rights idea in mind, in order not to divert 
and distract the research directions within the realm of U.S. foreign policy rather than hu-
man rights studies, this research takes the term ‘human rights’ as a collective set of values 
which have been internationally agreed on and documented in the Universal Declaration of 
Human rights and the two subsequent covenants—the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights.
This paper deploys a method of ‘process tracing’ in investigating the evolution of human 
rights in U.S.-China relations since the end of the Cold War. As Bennet et al. (1997: 5) has 
defined that, the general method of process tracing is to generate and analyse data on the 
causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening vari-
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ables, that link putative causes to observed effects. “In other words, of the two kinds of evi-
dence on the theoretical causal notions of causal effect and causal mechanisms, tests of co-
variation attempt to address the former, and process tracing assesses the later.” (ibid)  
According to Dunning (2015: 5), qualitative research often uses process tracing to denote a 
procedure for developing knowledge of context,  sequence, or process—essentially, for gen-
erating casual-process observations (CPOs). Colier et al.describe a causal-process observa-
tion as “an insight or piece of date that provides information about context, process, or 
mechanism.”(2010: 184) In other words, CPOs are simply pieces of contextual information 
upon which researchers can draw to evaluate particular assumptions or hypotheses. Ma-
honey (2010: 124) also points out that, “process tracing contributes to causal inference 
primarily through the discovery of CPOs.” 
Thus, to apply this method to the case of our research topic, what is the central hypothe-
ses? Which theory should we test? What is the independent variable and how does it relate 
to the causal inference which lies at the heart of this methodological framework? The ma-
jor rationale behind the exploration of the evolution of human rights in U.S.-China rela-
tions after the Cold War is to identify the linkage between human rights and traditional re-
alist factors involved in the bilateral relationship since 1989. The central hypothesis is that, 
in the case of U.S.-China relations at least, the idea of human rights has to work hand in 
hand with old school realist diplomatic concerns in order to maximise its influence and re-
inforce its position in the bilateral relationship. To put it on a grand scale, the ‘eternal con-
flict’ between realism and constructivism will be fully explored and the idealist theory of 
human rights in foreign policy will be tested. The casual-process observations will be gen-
erated from human rights related policies, legislation, etc. made by various U.S. adminis-
trations in relation to their China policies. The descriptions of those events are key to un-
derstand the causal process within each administration’s policy making and emphasises 
the causal sequence in which process tracing observations can be situated. To put it in a 
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simpler way, the more significant human rights related policies made by a U.S. administra-
tion, the more influence human rights idea has in U.S.-China relations. To clarify these ob-
servations and try to explain the rationale behind this causal process is the main purpose 
of this research.
In order to provide comprehensive causal process observations for each U.S. administra-
tion included in this research, the investigation of this evolution requires the author to ob-
tain a sufficient amount of primary and secondary resources in conjunction with the exist-
ing materials scattered in the huge volume of literature surrounding the topic of human 
rights and U.S. China policy. The primary resources used in this paper include original 
statements, speeches, president’s journal articles, key official’s memoirs, congressional 
records and legislations, etc.. The main secondary resources analysed in this paper come 
from various scholar’s articles, academic books as well as media reports, interview records 
and commentaries. With the combination of those resources, this research is able to pro-
duce an in-depth and reasonably comprehensive analysis on the evolution of human rights 
in the U.S.-China relations from the end of the Cold War to the present.
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Chapter One: The Prelude, from Normalisation to Tiananmen
This chapter lays the ground for the discussion on the evolution of human rights in U.S.-
China relations. It analyses the building and sustaining of the U.S.-China Grand Bargain 
achieved by leaders from both countries during the Cold War era. Despite its near absence 
since Nixon’s opening of China, the issue of human rights has gradually emerged from the 
rubbles of the Cold War and exploded after the breakout of the 1989 Tiananmen crack-
down. This analysis on G.H.W.Bush administration will be continued in more detail in the 
next chapter.
1.1 The Changing Image of China and the U.S.-China Grand Bargain
The origins of most of the problems facing both the United States and China dates back to 
World War II and its immediate aftermath. Not only because the United States was active-
ly providing support the Nationalists Kuomintang (KMT) government during the Sino-Ja-
panese war despite its best efforts of trying to stay neutral, but also because its backing of 
the KMT during the subsequent civil war  in China after 1946. By 1949, when the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) achieved victory in the mainland China, it became clear to the 
Communist that the U.S. was the major threat to the survival of the newly formed regime. 
With the events such as the breakout of the Korean War and the U.S. fleet’s blockade of the 
Taiwan Strait preventing the CCP’s attempt of unifying Taiwan with the mainland by force, 
the U.S. and China regarded each other as fundamental enemies from 1949 to 1971. (Vogel, 
1997:21-2) Ever since the normalisation of the bilateral relations after President Nixon’s 
visit to Beijing in 1972 and the signing of the symbolic Shanghai Communiqué, the leaders 
of both the United States and China have committed to a strategy of the so-called  “US-
China Grand Bargain”. During the 1970s and 1980s, President Richard Nixon and Chair-
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man Mao Zedong, followed by President Jimmy Carter and the Party Leader Deng Xiaop-
ing, have gradually constructed “a grand bargain that helped to stabilise Sino-American 
relations for nearly two decades, from 1972 to 1989.” (Lampton, 2001:2) The actual details 
of this grand strategy cover a whole spectrum of key policy areas, including the issue of 
Taiwan, Tibet, US security alliance arrangement in the Asia-Pacific region, trade and hu-
man rights.
Although it might be an old cliché to conclude that the forging of this ‘grand bargain’ was a 
convenient result of the gradual split between the Soviet Union and China and the chang-
ing tides of the Cold War in the 1970s, the nuances of the build-up to this mutual agree-
ment between the two hostile nations on this ‘grand bargain’ have to be emphasised in 
more detail. This emphasis on ‘other’ factors in the shaping of this monumental set of 
agreements does not intend to downgrade the structural factor emerged during the late 
Cold War era. It rather should be viewed as an additional argument supporting the overall 
conclusion made by many international relations scholars and historians on the eventual 
rapprochement between the U.S. and China. 
One key aspect of those supporting arguments this chapter intends to focus on is the grad-
ually changing image of China in the United States approaching to the end of the Cold War 
era. According to Robert Sutter’s (2013: 65) categorisation of the scholarly interpretations 
on the dramatic ‘turnabout’ leading to the rapprochement between the U.S. and China in 
1970s, there are mainly two school of thoughts on this subject. One focuses on the dramat-
ic change within the Chinese Communist Party which led the Chinese government to pur-
sue a much more pragmatic way in dealing with the United States. (Chen, 2001) The other 
school sees a reconfiguration in the U.S. calculus of China’s position in the international 
political system and its actual implications for the U.S. This is a much more widely investi-
gated argument which highlights the changing view of the Maoist regime as a potential as-
set for the U.S. strategy of focusing on dealing with a growing threat from the Soviet 
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Union. (Foot, Goh, Sutter) Rather than categorising those ‘different’ views as separate 
strands, this essay believes it would be better to see them as two sides of a coin instead, one 
focuses on the internal transformation within the Chinese Communist Party, the other 
puts more emphasis on the change of the U.S. political calculation on China during the 
post war period. 
Given the fact that the strategic necessities produced by the unprecedented political situa-
tion of the time were so prominent, it is almost impossible not to give primacy to the main-
stream emphasis on structural factors. It was this particularly strong strategic imperative, 
the Soviet threat, that slowly drove the leaders of the two countries together. Otherwise, 
“Maoist China in particular seemed positioned to continue resistance to the United States, 
while (the) U.S. interest in great flexibility toward China appeared likely to be over-
whelmed by opposing U.S. in tests and political inclinations.” (Sutter, 2013;66) Thus, the 
structural conditions required for a dramatic shift in the bilateral relations to happen are 
very clear. But at the same time, it has also to be argued that, as the captain of the ship, the 
will and determination of the president which have accelerated this change of China’s im-
age within the American politics have to be taken into account while addressing the forces 
behind the build-up to the eventual normalisation of the bilateral relations between the 
two nations. This is particularly true in the case of President Nixon.
The so-called ‘fall’ of China since the unsurprising Communist victory over the Nationalists 
in the mainland in 1949 has long been regarded as a common sentiment underlying the 
making of China policy, or to put it more precisely, the policy against the newly established 
Communist regime, in American politics in the immediate aftermath of World War II. The 
image of a Communist China hostile to the U.S. has been dramatically further reinforced 
by the subsequent confrontations of the Cold War and China’s allegiance to the Commu-
nist block. To make things even more unsalvageable in terms of China’s overall image in 
the U.S., the breakout of two Asian wars, Korean and Vietnam, reaffirmed to the American 
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politicians and public that China remained on the opposite side of the table with the U.S. 
in world politics. To challenge this solidly established image of adversary undoubtedly re-
quires not only tremendous personal courage and precise calculations and judgement on 
political current of the time, but most importantly the dramatic change of the direction of 
the Cold War world.
By late 1960s and early 70s, both of the two conditions had been met in a fashion that no 
one had foreseen a decade ago. Politicians are cunning beings and Richard Nixon was cer-
tainly one of them. Firstly, on a personal level, President Nixon began to argue that the sta-
tus of China had to be reassessed even before his election to the presidency in 1967. Writ-
ing in the Foreign Affairs magazine in his article on “Asia After Vietnam”, Nixon argued 
that the United States had to come to grips with the ‘opportunities’ China presented, rather 
than focusing on its potential threat, and should take the lead in reassessing China as a 
great and progressing nation instead. “There is no place on this small planet for a billion of 
its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation…(and) We simply cannot afford to 
leave China outside of the family of nations.” (Nixon, 1967) The president’s position of re-
assessing China’s status in defining America’s foreign policy objectives was reaffirmed by 
his grand opening to China later in his presidency. Although this well documented and 
widely debated event is not the focus of this essay, the monumental impact it produced 
cannot be overly emphasised.
The ice-breaking trip to China by President Nixon and the publication of the Shanghai 
Communiqué are arguably two pinnacle events of the US-China grand bargain. The presi-
dent’s arrival in Beijing in 1972 represented a genuine shift in U.S. China policy has been 
turned into reality. The signing of the Shanghai Communiqué has produced a general 
blueprint for future development in US-China relations. The key issues addressed in the 
document, however ambiguously worded, formed the basis for a healthy normalisation in 
the bilateral relations. Even up to the day of writing this essay, more than forty years later, 
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most policy areas the document has touched are still quite relevant, especially in the areas 
of the tricky issue of the status of Taiwan, Republic of China and America’s stance on the 
One-China Policy and military commitment to the island. On the issue of Taiwan, as 
Lampton (2001:2) has concluded that, because of the strategic imperative at the time of 
the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, both leaders from Beijing and Washington 
agreed that “the island’s status was an issue best placed in the background, to be dealt with 
later. This distant horizon allowed American and Chinese leaders to sidestep a problem for 
which they had no answer and to focus on cooperation elsewhere.” (ibid.) Unsurprisingly, 
this was an extremely convenient way to put aside deep-rooted differences and achieve 
short-term strategic goals. Many controversial issues including human rights have received 
the same treatment as the Taiwan issue. Leaders in both Beijing and Washington have 
downplayed the two countries’ deep divisions in the area of human rights “in the service of 
the more immediate objective of opposing Moscow.” (ibid.) Nevertheless, President 
Nixon’s opening of China and the subsequent normalisation of the bilateral relations have 
officially absorbed Communist China into the ‘friend category’ of the United States. As a 
result, the image of China has also been shifted from foe to friend accordingly. As Jean 
Garrison (2005:15) has summarised that, Nixon’s opening of China created a ‘splash’ of 
favourable public opinion toward China which has never been achieved before or after. 
And for President Nixon himself, he also benefited immensely from this dramatic event. 
According to the Gallup opinion poll form 1971-72, his approval rating rose to 56 percent 
after his trip to China. “Respondents were most impressed by the opportunity it provided 
for improved relations and for world peace, as well as by the warm reception the Chinese 
gave to Nixon.” (ibid:34) However, even to an ordinary eye, the fundamental flaws of this 
China initiative, or in President Nixon’s own words (1978:545), “one of the most publicly 
prepared surprises in history”, are very hard to be ignored. Like many other political 
events, there were no perfect solutions and the legacies of a great political moment such as 
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the opening of China are usually mixed. This mixed legacy of Nixon’s opening of China and 
the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué will be discussed in later part of the essay in 
more detail.
Second, according to Robert Garson’s research (1994:119), two other key events have 
greatly helped to shape the external conditions for the image of China in the United States 
to change in the late 1960s: one is that the Tet offensive in Vietnam convinced many in the 
United States that it should lesson its military involvement in the country and reconsider 
its Southeast Asian and Asian policy in general; the other event was the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 in the west coupled with its border skirmishes with China in the 
east, usually identified as the beginning of the Sino-Soviet split. Both of those two key 
events contributed to the overall reconfiguration process in American foreign policy. And 
in turn, it helped to create a perfect environment for the United States to review its deal-
ings with Communist China. The Nixon administration successfully took advantage of 
changing strategic circumstances to help legitimate a corresponding change in policy. 
(Garrison: 2005:40) And the main theme cultivated by the Nixon administration was that 
he linked the theme of his China policy to the overall approach of his “structure for peace”. 
“From this the administration built broad acceptance for themes that guided the general 
U.S. relationship with China for the next quarter century.” (ibid) As a result of President 
Nixon’s triumphant visit to Beijing in 1972, the dominant perception shifted from regard-
ing China as a threat to the United States to considering a more friendly China as a source 
for peace and stability to prosper.
1.2 The Dissolution of the Grand Bargain
It has become a common conclusion of post-Cold War analysis to say that the gradual 
warming of Sino-Soviet relations in the latter half of the 1980s, capped off by the total col-
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lapse of the Soviet Union as a unified global power in 1991, “dramatically weakened the ra-
tionale in both nations (United States and China) for subordinating latent frictions in the 
U.S-China relationship.” (Lampton, 2001:3) It is very true that the structural realist con-
clusion has been widely endorsed over the years. With the sudden disappearance of the 
Soviet power and the total collapse of the old bipolar system, the basis for the existing 
American super power to continue to cooperate with its ‘wartime partners’ has been dra-
matically weakened. As we have briefly mentioned above that the fundamental flaws of the 
U.S.-China grand bargain could easily be spotted. Although we should not dismiss the 
genuine benefits achieved by this historical series of agreements as purely for Cold War 
anti-Soviet effort, it has been argued that the existence of the Soviet threat was the back-
bone for most of the cooperations and agreements reached by the United States and Com-
munist China. In the absence of this overwhelming raison d’éta for both the United States 
and China to accommodate each other’s interests for a common cause, the dissolution of 
the Grand Bargain is almost inevitable.
To declare that the Grand Bargain has been completely dissolved because of this seismic 
change in the international system is undoubtedly an overstatement. The fruit of more 
than a decade of relatively warm relationship could be found in almost all aspects of the 
bilateral relations ranging from security agreements, weapons proliferation issues to eco-
nomics and business interests. Therefore, the dissolution itself is not a straightforward and 
clear-cut process at all. Despite the overarching structural reasoning behind the dissolu-
tion of the Grand Bargain, there are a host of other developments which are equally impor-
tant in the analysis of this process. And as the following discussions will show that, in fact, 
many of those factors have proven that the dissolution of the Grand Bargain was not as 
serve as many have argued. On the contrary, these factors have in effect contributed to pre-
serve much of the legacies of the Grand Bargain and encouraged Beijing and Washington 
to maintain a healthy bilateral relation.
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First, the changing status of the American power has to be reiterated. There is no way to 
get around  with the fact that the status of the United States has been completely tran-
scended and the relative power of the United States over other players in the international 
system has been dramatically increased after the demise of the Soviet Union. As a result of 
this newly transformed status, America’s policies toward many other countries either 
friendly or not require an immediate update which should be befitting its new role in the 
international system. In the case of U.S.-China relations, U.S. officials have made sure 
their Chinese counterparts in Beijing understood that the United States was no longer as 
anxious, as evident in the first decade of U.S.-China rapprochement and normalisation, to 
seek China’s favour in improving U.S.-China relations as a source of leverage against Mos-
cow. “the United States was increasingly confident in its strategic position vis-a-vis the So-
viet Union, and begun a process to roll back the gains the Soviets had made in the pervious 
decade in various parts of the developing world.” (Sutter, 2013:93) However, this newly 
transformed balance of power between the U.S. and China did not necessarily translated 
into a definite deterioration of the bilateral relations. It was China that appeared to be the 
biggest loser if the U.S-China relationship has gone downhill during this turbulent period 
of change. After more than a decade of interchange with the United States, Beijing has 
recognised that not only the United States needed China to be a counterweight against the 
Soviet Union but vice versa as well. Because of the fact that China is only one part of the 
United States global counter balance strategy against the Soviet Union and the United 
States is the single biggest supporter in China’s camp against the Soviet threat, China 
needed the U.S. much more than the U.S needed China. This has become particularly true 
when the Soviet threat has suddenly collapsed in the late 1980s and early 90s. Thus, how 
to adjust themselves to this new political environment in order to maintain, if not comprise 
too much to do so, a stable U.S.-China relationship became the top foreign policy objective 
for the leaders in Beijing to think about. And most importantly, China increasingly needed 
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a good relationship with the United States to “allow for smooth and advantageous Chinese 
economic interchange with the developed countries of the West and Japan and the in-
ternational institutions they controlled.” (ibid:93-4) By recognising this new reality, with 
the efforts and compromises made by both Washington and Beijing, the bilateral relation-
ship has been maintained if not improved to a relatively much healthier level. The success-
ful visit to Beijing made by President Reagan in 1984 can be seen as an early representa-
tion of this mutual effort in maintaining a good relationship between the two nations. This 
warmer and closer development in the U.S-China relations has also been reflected by the 
dramatic improving image of China in American public opinion. Although American public 
opinion in general was in favour of President Nixon’s opening of China in 1972, only about 
23 percent of the respondents rated China favourably. And for the same period of time, the 
Soviet Union’s favourable rating was 40 percent and Taiwan’s was 53 percent. (quote by 
Garrison, 2005:34) By the late 1980s, however, the result of this swing of public opinion 
on the image of China could not have been more dramatic. When asked to rate their overall 
opinion of China in an early 1989 Gallup public opinion poll, 72 percent of respondents 
were either very favourable or mostly favourable toward the People’s Republic of China 
while only 13 percent were mostly or very unfavourable. (ibid: 107) From this positive de-
velopment alone, we could argue that President Nixon’s dream of a warmer and closer 
U.S.-China relationship has not been derailed by the seismic ending of the Cold War. How-
ever, it has to  be noted that there were a few other factors that need to be taken into ac-
count as well.
The second factor is that, not only has the relative power of the United States has been 
completely transformed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, China itself has also under-
gone a process of metamorphosis into a global economic powerhouse. The success story of 
China’s economic growth started from the 1970s under Deng Xiaoping’s directive of reform 
and opening policy has been widely investigated in both the areas of political science and 
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economics. Although China is still a very poor country measured by GDP per capita and a 
whole host of various problems caused by economic developments notably in the area of 
environment and human rights remains a prominent distraction to the health of its econ-
omy, the continued rapid economic growth over the next few decades is highly likely to 
continue at a respectful rate compared with other major economies in the world. And this 
is not something that could be stopped by any feasible means the United States has at its 
disposal. “China has a very high saving and investment rate, and it has already acquired 
technology and management skills that will spread from its coast to the inner provinces. Its 
virtually unlimited supply of willing low-cost labourers, when combined with its new capi-
tal and technology, make high productivity increases almost inevitable.” (Vogel, 1997) Al-
though this is an observation made by Ezra Vogel almost two decades ago at the time of 
writing this essay, all of the predictions have turned out to be very accurate almost two 
decades later. According to the Economist magazine (2016), amid the aftermath of 2015 
Chinese stock market crash, the Chinese economy is expected to grow at a moderate rate of 
6.7% year by year into the next decade and the general prospect of the country’s economy 
remains strong if the Chinese government continues to commit themselves on a course of 
economic reform. With the dramatic increase in its economic strength, China was expected 
to be more proactive in protecting its interests and making frictions with the United States’ 
interests much more frequently and more assertively than two decades ago.  However, by 
checking all the major disputes between China and the U.S. during the period of late 1970s 
to late 1980s, the strongest protests articulated by Beijing were mainly focused on the issue 
of Taiwan, which will be the subject of discussion in the next part. Despite some short-
term discomforts caused by highly sensitive issues such as Taiwan and also thanks to the 
efforts made by key officials in both Washington and Beijing to contain each side from 
overreacting, the U.S.-China relation during this period has not been led to a point of seri-
ous disruption. On the other hand, the benefit brought by China’s rapid economic growth 
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is much easier to find. Apart from the obvious economic benefits created by ever closer 
economic ties between the United States and China, the benefit received by the overall im-
age of China in American politics as a rapidly progressing nation is much more impressive 
and its legacy is much more long-lasting. Since many Americans including government of-
ficials and members of Congress subconsciously believed that China was moving in the 
‘right’ direction (Lampton, 2001:3), although not too rapidly, the prospect of a Chinese 
democracy should not be far away down the road. This argument of connecting economic 
growth with democratic progress in China created a long-lasting impact in the area of Chi-
na policy making in successive governments after the Cold War. Such as Warren Christo-
pher (1998: 31) later stated that, “[O]ur policy will seek to facilitate a peaceful evolution of 
China from communism to democracy by encouraging the forces of economic and political 
liberalisation in that great country.” This will be analysed in more detail in later chapters of 
this essay. But for now, it can be argued that the rapid economic growth has helped to 
shape a progressive image for China in American policy which in turn contributed to the 
overall improvements of the bilateral relationship between the United States and China 
during the period of the ending of the Cold War.
The third factor is the issue of Taiwan. Before we dive into the argument, it has to be said 
that the politics of the Taiwan issue requires a separate and much more detailed investiga-
tion due to the sheer complexity of the issue in U.S.-China relations. This section can only 
be seen as a very short analysis which tries to support the argument made previously. It 
might appear to be a surprise to many to argue that the delicate issue of Taiwan has some-
how contributed to the overall stability of U.S.-China relations during the period of the 
ending of the Cold War. By considering the recent post-WWII history, it is a common per-
ception that the sensitive issue of Taiwan creates everything but stability in the bilateral 
relations between the United States and China. The intention of this section is not counter 
this common perception but to view it from an opposite angle. If there is one theme which 
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could summarise the developments of U.S.-China relationship after the WWII in a nut-
shell, it can only be the issue of Taiwan. Ever since the end of the civil war in 1949, the sta-
tus of the island regime governed by the Kuomintang or the Nationalist Party maintained 
its relevance up to this day and will continue to pose probably the single most difficult task 
for leaders both in Beijing and Washington for the years to come. Although the One-China 
Policy has been agreed first by President Nixon and endorsed by the successive presidents 
ever since and becomes one of the foundations of the bilateral relationship, the notion of 
One-China is not something newly pushed to the table. In fact, the People’s Republic and 
Taiwan might disagree about who should rule the entirety of China, their shared view of a 
single, unified China provided a basis for stability. (Lampton, 2001:3) Because of this clear 
mutual recognition of the unity of China as a whole, it provides the United States with an 
absolute redline when confronted with problems and crisis caused by Taiwan issue. The 
continuous balancing act performed by every U.S. administration between the China lobby 
and the forces that support a closer U.S.-China relations becomes an established trail for 
every president. Whether it is the passage of the Taiwan Relation Act under Carter or the 
huge arms sale to Taiwan under Reagan, the Taiwan issue has become a constant feature 
in the bilateral relations. Thus, it becomes a problem area where both sides are reasonably 
well prepared for in various ways, since the fact that neither the passage of the Taiwan Re-
lation Act nor the arms sale has seriously disrupted the bilateral relations. The change in 
America’s China policy in the 1970s and 80s brought a new strategy where Taiwan was at-
tained  within a greater context of simultaneously constructive relations among the United 
States, Japan, and China. And as a result, “this context would dramatically reduce the 
PRC’s incentives to pursue an aggressive policy toward Taiwan and would encourage Tai-
wan to develop its own direct links with the mainland.” (Oksenberg, 1997:68-9) In many 
ways, the Taiwan issue acts more like a safety net safeguarding the bilateral relationship 
from hitting the ground. Although there will always be a possibility that this safety net 
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might be broken at some point, for the period discussed in this essay at least, the new 
strategy has been proven to a successful one for both the United States and the parties 
across the Taiwan Strait.
It has always been a tricky task to list out a range of factors which might have influenced a 
particular political issue. In our case, the list of potential factors that might have affected 
the dissolution of the Grand Bargain in U.S.-China relations can continue to go on. Two of 
the most commonly debated areas are the domestic politics argument and the economic 
interdependence argument. Both interpretations are equally important in analysing the 
dissolution process. However, this essay intends to focus more on much less touched as-
pects of the reasoning behind the dissolution of the Grand Bargain. By re-examining the 
United States’ ascended status in the international system after the fall of the Soviet Union, 
China’s increased economic strength and the unique place of Taiwan in U.S.-China rela-
tions, we have discovered that the Grand Bargain achieved by previous governments since 
the normalisation of the bilateral relations has not been dissolved into nothingness. On the 
contrary, those factors have in effect contributed to preserve and continue the legacies of 
the Grand Bargain in one way or another. In short, the legacies of the Grand Bargain and 
the approach of establishing a closer U.S-China relationship have been continued into the 
next decade after the fall of the Soviet Union.
1.3 The Turning Point: the 1989 Tiananmen Crackdown
After setting the stage in the backgrounds by laying out the normalisation of relations, the 
issue of human rights has finally been placed onto the central stage of the U.S.-China rela-
tions. Although the issue of human rights or ‘morality’ in general has been in America’s 
foreign policy for quite sometime and generations of presidents have declared their alle-
giance to the cause of a moral foreign policy to various degrees, it has not been able to 
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make itself into U.S.-China relations successfully. Even under the ‘human rights president’ 
Jimmy Carter, the issue of human rights remained as no more than a side note issue in the 
U.S.-China exchanges. As Arthur Schlesinger has concluded that this political bias had less 
to do with inconsistent of human rights denunciation than geopolitical significance, since 
“Washington was fearless in denouncing human rights abuses in countries like Cambodia, 
Paraguay and Uganda, where the United States had negligible strategic and economic in-
terests; a good deal less fearless toward South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia and most of 
black Africa; increasingly circumspect about the Soviet Union; totally silent about 
China.” (Schlesinger, 1979:515) With the demise of the Soviet Union and the ending of the 
Cold War, human rights finally found a chance to move a few steps forward towards the 
front roll issues in U.S.-China relations. This change was very evident during the contro-
versial and chaotic event of a well-know Chinese dissent Fang Lizhi’s invitation to Presi-
dent G.W. Bush’s reciprocal banquet during his first visit to Beijing in February 1989, after 
attending Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s funeral. Unlike any of President Bush’s predeces-
sors, the issue of human rights has never been in such a prominent concern in China policy 
at the early hour of one’s presidency. Thus it was glaringly evident that, “clashes between 
the need to deal effectively with China’s leaders and America’s sympathy with dissident 
and the parallel gulf between the requirements of effective diplomacy and the reality of 
public relations in the global arena.” (Lampton, 2001:20) If this incident can only be seen 
as just one of those daily diplomatic dramas in U.S.-China relations, the event occurred a 
few months later in the centre of Beijing is definitely an avalanche.
Unprecedented mass demonstrations were carried out by students and workers initially in 
memory of former general secretary of the Communist Party Hu Yaobang and later evolved 
into full-scale mass protests about almost everything wrong with the government. After a 
short period of inner power struggle within the Communist Party, Deng Xiaoping was de-
cisive in resolving Chinese leadership differences in favour of hard-liners supporting a vio-
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lent crackdown on the demonstrators and a broader suppression of political dissent that 
began with the bloody attack on Tiananmen Square on June 4th, 1989. (Saich, 
2004:70-74; Vogel, 2011 and Sutter, 2013:95) The details of this tragic event were well 
documented and debated among scholars, notably Rosemary Foot’s influential works on 
“The Practice of Power: U.S. relations with China since 1949” (1997) and “Rights beyond 
Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China” (2000). It 
becomes almost a compulsory subject of analysis for every scholar and student who en-
gages with post-Cold War U.S.-China relations analysis. Rather than reiterate the flow of 
events and the significance of the event and following the footsteps of those great scholars 
and historians, it would be more fruitful to focus arguments on specific factors that have 
greatly contributed to this turning point for the issue of human rights to be established in 
the front roll of U.S.-China relations. Two factors will be focused in the following parts: the 
destruction of China’s image in the United States; and the loss of a China expert president.
As discussed in previous parts of this chapter, the image of China has experienced a gener-
ally positive development which comes hand in hand with the deepening progress under 
the agreements achieved by the Grand Bargain in the U.S.-China relations. During the dis-
solution of the Grand Bargain at the end of the Cold War period, the overall image of China 
in the United States has maintained itself at a very healthy level. And also helped with the 
rapid economic growth throughout the 1980s, an image of progressive China has been 
widely perceived by the American politicians and public. It can be argued that the image of 
China perceived in the U.S. is a clear indicator of the status of the bilateral relationship. 
When the People’s Liberation Army carried out their operation in Tiananmen Square on 
June 3rd, 1989, all of the positivity about China that have been accumulated over the years 
since the 1970s has wiped out. Because of this cataclysmic event, to declare a complete de-
struction of China’s image in the United States and in the wider world would not be an ab-
surd overstatement. As Secretary of State James Baker stated in his memoirs, “[A]lmost 
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overnight, one of America’s most striking cold war strategic successes was shaken to its 
core.” (Baker, 1995: 98) Since the carnage happened in Beijing has been broadcasted 
worldwide on live television thanks to the great technological advancement at the end of 
the 1980s, the impact left by graphic imagery is far more profound than listening to your 
daily news bulletin. And U.S. leaders and public were shocked by the brutal display of 
power by the Communist government. “Expectations of rapid Chinese political reform 
dropped; they were replaced by outward hostility at first, followed by often-grudging 
pragmatism about the need for greater U.S.-engagement with the Chinese administration 
as it rose in prominence in Asian and world affairs.” (Sutter, 2013: 95-6) Although the po-
litical wounds can be mended in a matter of years, a damaged image and reputation of a 
nation will take significantly longer to recover. 
According to the Gallup public opinion poll published in 2000, on the tenth anniversary of 
the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, American public opinion remains negative towards Chi-
na. While the public attitudes toward China have undergone enormous change since the 
1970s, these attitudes were very little difference in 1999 than they were ten years earlier 
after the Tiananmen Square took place. By August of 1989, favourable attitudes toward 
China has fallen precipitously from 72% to only 34%. There has been some slight move-
ment up ad down in the intervening years, but in a recent Gallup Poll conducted in May 
1999, favourable attitudes were at just 38%, almost exactly the same as ten years ago. 
(Gallup, 2000: 198) Due to this almost irreversible damage to the overall image of China 
compounded with the fact that the 1989 Tiananmen event was heavily human rights relat-
ed, a spotlight focused on China’s human rights conditions has been permanently estab-
lished in American politics ever since. The U.S. media “switched coverage and opinion of 
China, portraying the policies and practices of the Chinese administration” and its human 
rights record “in much more critical light than in the years leading up to Tiananmen.” (Sut-
ter, 2013:95) Thus, it can be argued that the devastating destruction of China’s overall im-
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age has given chance to the rise of human rights issue to the forefront of U.S.-China rela-
tion debate. And at the same time, a focus on China’s human rights conditions has helped 
to sustained the negative attitudes toward China among American politicians and public 
over the years.
The second factor which has contributed to this turning point is the ‘fall’ of a China expert 
president. To clarify this assertion in more detail, it would be very helpful to divide it into 
two parts: G.W.Bush as a China expert president; and what has been lost at this turning 
point. President Bush’s close connection with China was very well known. And this special-
ty has been appreciated both by the President himself and the government in Beijing. In 
the speech given at the Welcoming Banquet during his first visit to China in 1989, the Pres-
ident has express his affection to China by emphasising how much time he and his wife 
Barbara has spent in this country since been posted as chief of the United States Liaison 
Office in Beijing together with his family in 1974. (Bush, 1989) The president has also been 
given the privilege to be the first U.S. president interviewed on live television broadcast in 
China. President Bush spoke of his “homecoming” and fond memories in Beijing, and also 
gave his reasoning for visiting in such an early hour of his presidency by saying that, “I 
wanted to reaffirm the importance that the United States places on this relationship, and I 
wanted to pledge to the Chinese leaders—and I’ve met the top four leaders in the last day 
and a half—that this  relationship will grow and it will prosper.” (quoted by Lampton, 
2001:18) This specialty in China affairs has later been proven to a key asset for the Presi-
dent to preserve the U.S.-China relationship in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown.
To argue the ‘fall’ of a China expert president is not to say that President Bush has resigned 
or happened to be unable to lead his government because he did not resign and did con-
tinue to finish his presidency. It is the loss of the golden opportunity for the bilateral rela-
tions to prosper that this section would like to focus on. With a U.S. president who has a 
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diplomatic specialty in China affairs and close personal connections with leader in Beijing, 
the developments in the bilateral relations between the two countries were expected  at 
least to be maintained if not greatly improved. This prospect of a possible ‘golden era’ has 
been completely demolished by the 1989 Tiananmen event. And the majority of the politi-
cal energy and resources of the Bush administration have been diluted to manage this cri-
sis. Secretary of State James baker later recalled the situation as, “ we were challenged to 
defend a policy encompassing geostrategic, commercial, and human rights interests that in 
large measure conflicted.” (Baker, 1995:98)  As Lampton (2001:22) has summarised that, 
from the opening hours of the post-Tiananmen era, “George Bush was committed to a co-
herent but difficult-to-maintain course, a course that sought to preempt over reaction, 
maintain direct, personal communication with Beijing, and retain presidential control of 
foreign policy.” If a president can get a grip on a crisis as serious as the 1989 Tiananmen 
incident, we do have enough confidence to suggest that a ‘loss’ of his presidency is a missed 
opportunity for a potentially fruitful bilateral relationship to prosper. This devotion  of 
preserving the U.S.-China relations has left the president very vulnerable to the attacks 
from other areas especially the attacks from domestic sources and the Congress. Bush’s 
pragmatic approach to China in the aftermath of Tiananmen has increasingly become a 
distinct liability, notably during his failed reelection campaign in 1992 and the president 
has been condemned by then president candidate Clinton for “coddling dictators in Bei-
jing”. (Cohen, 2000:229) Thus, the ‘loss’ of a China expert president has cost the U.S.-Chi-
na relationship dearly and gave chance for the issue of human rights to established itself in 
the front seats of America’s China policy.
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1.4 Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief analysis on the background within which the evolution of the 
issue of human rights occurred, from near absence into a grand explosion of develop-
ments. The overwhelming preoccupation of the Cold War strategic concerns has dominat-
ed the bilateral relations since Nixon’s grand opening of China. With the ending of the Cold 
War approaches after the unstoppable demise of the Soviet Union, the issue of human 
rights can no longer be contained. Just need a sparkle, it will explode. Sparkled indeed, by 
the hands of the Communist government in Beijing in 1989, the issue of human rights ex-
ploded splendidly in the U.S.-China relations.
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Chapter Two: The Ending of the Bush Era and the Rise of Human Rights
Looking back at the bilateral relations between the United States and China during the pe-
riod from 1989 and through the 1990s, it can be confidently asserted that there has never 
been a such turbulent era since the normalisation of the bilateral relations in 1979. This 
period has witnessed “repeated cycles of crisis” which have been heavily influenced by the 
newly active domestic debated in the United States over America’s policy toward China af-
ter the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. (Sutter, 2013:104) In a more popular quotation used 
by many to summarise the bilateral relationship during the time, Secretary of State James 
Baker concluded that, “[f]or the remainder of 1989—and indeed the rest of the Bush presi-
dency—the Chinese relationship essentially treaded water.” (Baker, 1995: 112) This chapter 
analyses the details of how the Bush administration managed the U.S.-China relationship 
in this treading water and how the issue of human rights has been catapulted to the fore-
front of the bilateral relations.
2.1 The Beginning of An End
The significance of the 1989 bloodshed in the Tiananmen Square has been widely analysed 
and recognised among scholars as of the most influential turning points in U.S.-China rela-
tions in recent history. (Lampton, 2001:17-30; Foot, 119:20 and 243; and Sutter, 2013: 95-
99) The issue of human rights has come “sharply to the fore” of public concern in the Unit-
ed States as a direct result of the tragic event of Tiananmen. “More than three-quarters of 
the American people who were polled said they had followed the 4 June events ‘closely’ or 
‘very closely’ on their TV Screens.” (Foot, 1995: 244) To reflect this immensely powerful 
public outcry, the Bush administration has been forced, despite the President’s reluctance 
of isolating China completely, to impose a series of bans and embargo covering areas from 
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military to economics. Since it became clear that the Communist government and its lead-
ers had no intention to express any kind of regret at the violent official reactions to the 
demonstration, “as a demonstration of America’s central role within international lending 
organisations and within the Western alliance, Washington recommended that all further 
lending to China by international institutions be suspended, and it urged its Western allies 
to impose sanctions similar to America’s own.” (ibid: 245) 
However, the challenge the Bush administration faced was to make sure that China did not 
isolate itself from the international community and thereby jeopardising the relatively sta-
ble and flourishing relationship this government and its predecessors had worked hard to 
forge. This challenge has been accurately summarised by the Deputy Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger as “to make American revulsion at and condemnation of the blood-
shed at Tiananmen, yet express it in a way that would maintain to the extent possible our 
ability to influence events within China encourage a return to reform of the economy and 
the society.” (Eagleburger, 1990:8) The Bush administration argued that, “gains through 
engagement rather than isolation meant that, despite the events in Tiananmen Square, 
China’s people enjoyed more freedom than in 1971, when China had a much brutal 
regime.” (Garrison, 2005: 114) In the president’s own words, the reasoning for his gov-
ernment’s reactions to the event should involve “reasoned, careful action that takes into 
account both our long-term interests and recognition of a complex internal situation in 
China.” (Bush, 1989) As the president has elaborated in more detail that,
“There clearly is turmoil within the ranks of the political leadership, as well as the Peo-
ple's Liberation Army. And now is the time to look beyond the moment to important and 
enduring aspects of this vital relationship for the United States. Indeed, the budding of 
democracy which we have seen in recent weeks owes much to the relationship we have 
developed since 1972. And it's important at this time to act in a way that will encourage 
the further development and deepening of the positive elements of that relationship and 
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the process of democratisation. It would be a tragedy for all if China were to pull back to 
its pre-1972 era of isolation and repression.”(ibid)
This logic has produced a very clear and robust incentive for the U.S. government to main-
tain its relationship with the Communist China and continue its engagement with Beijing 
with minimum disruptions possible. Not only the president held this position but also 
many of his colleagues in White House have similar views on how to react to the event. 
For example, in Secretary of State James Baker’s memoirs, he compared the Tiananmen 
situation with Hungary in 1956 and argued that any rash reaction could trigger a much 
more violent response that would genuinely devastate the bilateral relations. (Baker, 1996: 
104) And as the President has pointed out that there has clearly been a power struggle 
within the Communist party and within the People’s Liberation Army. President Bush later 
remarked that “he no longer could say whether Deng Xiaoping remained China’s preemi-
nent leader and indicated that the Tiananmen crackdown may have been the work of Chi-
na’s more conservative leaders.” (quoted by Ross, 2001:25) This careful observation of the 
crisis within China has provided the White House another strong incentive not to rush to 
react to the Tiananmen event. 
In February 1990, “the President explained to Congress that political struggles in Beijing in 
the immediate aftermath of the fall of Romanian president Nicolae Ceausescu” has pre-
vented the Chinese government from adequately respond to the U.S initiatives. (ibid: 26) 
The Chinese leaders’ reactions to the fall of Romanian president Ceausescu , especially the 
executions of him and his wife on December 25 1989, have been dramatically captured in 
Benjamin Yang’s work on Deng Xiaoping’s biography. Yang recounts how Deng, Politburo 
members, and veteran cadres watched a video cassette recording of the Ceausescu’s execu-
tion in stunned silence: “‘We’ll be like this’, said a voice from among the viewers, ‘if we 
don’t strengthen our proletarian dictatorship and repress the reactionaries.’ ‘Yes, we’ll be 
like this’, said Deng, expressing his now opinion, ‘if we don’t carry out reforms and bring 
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about benefits to the people.’” (Yang, 1998: 257) Although the original sources were unoffi-
cial and questionable, the graphical imagery of the execution of a former leader of a com-
munist comrade nation who has close personal connections with Chinese communist lead-
ers has certainly created a shockwave and a bitter chill in the spines of leaders in Beijing. 
Due to the high sensitivity of the matter and near impossibility of accessing the Chinese 
top secret archives, we may never be able to verify how much the impact produced by an 
event like the execution has on the psyche of Chinese leaders. It is however reasonable for 
us to argue that the execution of Ceausescu has possibly been used as a potent counter-ar-
gument by the conservative forces of the Communist Party to silence any possible opposi-
tion to the iron-fist rule by the government. It might be possible to explore a bit more into 
the psyche of those Chinese leaders at the time by saying that, the deprivation of other 
people’s human rights, especially theirs subjects, workers, students, and protesters and 
demonstrators, it was merely a matter of stability; but when it comes to the deprivation of 
their own human rights, i.e. the overthrow of government and the execution of former 
leaders, it was a serious matter of survival. Therefore, when the survival instinct kicks in 
among the leaders in Beijing, there were only two options to end this madness: an oblivion 
of the entire Chinese Communist rule or a reconciliation with the current regime in order 
to tranquillise Beijing’s highly alerted nerves. Since a total overthrow of the Communist 
government was not a viable option at the time, there was only one way forward.
Thus, in an attempt of preserving the core of the bilateral relations from being seriously 
damaged, President Bush has sent his national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and 
deputy secretary of state Lawrence S. Eagleburger on two secret missions to the Chinese 
capital in July and December. This move of sending an emissary to Beijing was not a sud-
den decision made by the President just to react to the situation with a personal touch. It 
has later been revealed that President Bush has expressed his opinion on the necessity of 
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maintaining the dialogue undisrupted in a particularly heartfelt and frank letter to Deng 
Xiaoping. The President wrote that,
“I have thought of asking you to receive a special emissary who could speak with total 
candor to you representing my heartfelt convictions on these matters. If you feel such an 
emissary could be helpful, please let me know and we will work cooperatively to see that 
his mission is kept in total confidence. I have insisted that all departments of the US gov-
ernment be guided in their statements and actions from my guidance in the White House. 
Sometimes in an open system such as ours it is impossible to control all leaks; but on this 
particular letter there are no copies, not one, outside of my own personal file.” (Bush, 
1989)
There has never been a president of the United States could address his Chinese counter-
part in such a personal manner like President Bush. By the time of writing this essay, al-
most three decades and three different American presidencies after the 1989 Tiananmen 
event, it could be concluded that there perhaps will never be a president of the United 
States that could replicate president Bush’s success in establishing concrete personal con-
nections with his Chinese counterpart in foreseeable future. By considering the ex-
traordinary circumstances President Bush was facing at the time, such as risking relentless 
domestic criticism by violating sanctions on high-level exchanges between the United 
States and China, the significance of this personal letter becomes more impressive.
Although the success of establishing personal ‘back door’ contacts with Chinese leaders 
and arranging those secret diplomatic missions under such an intense political environ-
ment have once again demonstrated President Bush’s outstanding diplomatic experience 
and specialty in China affairs, it has ultimately been proven that the secrecy involved in 
those attempts has greatly damaged the integrity of the administration and further reaf-
firmed the ‘perceived duplicity’ of the president himself on his stance on China in the af-
termath of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. (Sutter, 2013:105) By December 1989 when 
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those secret missions have been disclosed by the White House, it has become very clear 
that the congressional and media reaction was bitterly critical of the president’s 
‘deception’. 
For example, Representative Samuel Gejdenson (D-Conn.), a member of the House For-
eign Affairs Committee, who said that Bush "has misled the American people and the Con-
gress…and most people felt the President stated U.S. policy as cutting off high-level con-
tacts. This pulls aside the charade that there was an attempt here to do business with the 
moderates" in the Chinese leadership, he said in a telephone interview. "It sends a signal 
around the globe that you can kill people and the Bush Administration will not hold you 
accountable for any period of time.” (Los Angeles Times, 1989) In effect, the Democratic 
members of Congress were determined to punish China’s communist government for the 
atrocities they have committed in Tiananmen Square. At the minimum, “they wanted to 
withdraw tariff privileges of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status China held, along 
with more than a hundred other countries. Bush had vetoed each congressional attempt to 
revoke MFN.” (Hyland, 1999: 110) Because the president strongly believed China’s poten-
tial strategic value to the United States in various areas. To place firm conditions on Chi-
na’s MFN status renewal produces unnecessary tensions in U.S.-China relations in a time 
of rapid change in world politics. In President Bush’s own words, “MFN tariff status has 
given the Chinese the incentive to take into account U.S. interests—on fair trade practice 
globally, human rights, missile and arms sales, and cooperation on such regional issues as 
Cambodia and the Korean peninsula.” (quoted by Garrison, 2005:122)
In defence of the president’s position, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has 
pointed out that, “the President knew he would be taking this action in the face of popular 
opposition and at substantial political risk, but it was a risk he was willing to take because 
of his experience over the years in dealing with China and the Chinese, because of his per-
sonal acquaintance with many of China’s leaders, and because of his judgement that it just 
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might begin a process which would lead to improvements in the lot of Chinese 
people.” (Eagleburger, 1990: 9) This wave of congressional pressure has also been met 
with the administration’s frustration at Beijing’s unwillingness to fully reciprocate the ad-
ministration’s efforts and its failure to fulfil its share of the ‘package solution’, a succession 
of reciprocal steps that each side would take to resolve the various issues in dispute, which 
has first been suggested by Deng Xiaoping via Henry Kissinger’s channel. (Ross, 2001: 27) 
Probably by recognising the severity of the potential risks and President Bush’s fierce do-
mestic opposition, the government in Beijing has responded by releasing political prison-
ers prior to the renewal of its MFN status has been debated in U.S. Congress. As one Chi-
nese researcher has revealed that, “advice from officials within particular government de-
partments and from research institutes in Beijing and Shanghai was instrumental in con-
vincing” the Chinese government of the “economic cost if the United States should termi-
nate China’s MFN status.” (Ding, 1991:1160) This particular battle caused by the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown between the White House and Congress over China’s MFN status 
has become an annual event in the following year until China officially joined the World 
Trade Organisation in December 2001. 
Despite President Bush’s best policy efforts in avoiding the serious congressional challenge 
of the annual renewal of China’s MFN status, the president had not calmed congressional 
debate or restored a consensus in U.S. China policy. And the president was “still laboured 
under the perception in many quarters that he was less interested than others in human 
rights in China, was overly attentive to the interests of Chinese leaders, and put excessive 
stress on China’s alleged strategic importance for the United States.” (Sutter, 2001:94) In 
late 1990 and early 1991, thanks to the intense situations in the Gulf and the Iraqi con-
frontation, the president was able to persuade the majority of Congress to recognise the 
perceived need for China’s backing in that global crisis. President Bush relied on his au-
thority in foreign policy and his domestic popularity to “wage an uncompromising veto 
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battle against his congressional critics.” (Ross, 2001: 32) By mid-1991, many more mem-
bers of Congress become more critical of China on human rights and trade and arms pro-
liferation issues and started to criticise the Bush administration’s ‘failed’ China policy. 
“Concerned that congressional anger might jeopardise the annual waiver continuing MFN 
treatment for Chinese imports, and reflecting their own frustrations with China’s policies, 
Bush administration officials toughened policy in several areas.” (Sutter, 2001:94) Al-
though the president has managed to gain just enough votes in the Senate to secure Chi-
na’s MFN status renewed without placing firm conditions, the administration has been 
gradually weakened after each round of ‘trench warfare’ with Congress. As the president 
faced declining popularity ratings in 1991 and a difficult reelection, “he encountered the 
prospect of defending his forthcoming June 1991 approval of MFN status for China and re-
sisting greater congressional activism to pass legislation linking China’s MFN status with it 
human rights record.” (Ross, 2001:33) Unsurprisingly, the president was compelled to 
make concessions each time to gain bipartisan support for sustaining China’s MFN status. 
And each year “after the House of Representatives passed nearly unanimous legislation 
suspending China’s MFN status, the Senate became the focus of the conflict between the 
White House and advocates of economic sanctions. And each year the president engaged 
himself in congressional politics to ensure that the Senate would not override his 
veto.” (quoted by Ross, ibid.) Thus, China’s MFN status renewal together with its human 
rights connections has become an instrumental tool used by the Congress to poise itself 
into the administration’s China policy making.
2.2 The ‘Pelosi Bill’ Debate
Apart from the annual MFN battle, the President was yet to face his most challenging legis-
lation proposed by Congress in relation to the 1989 Tiananmen event and broad human 
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rights concerns in general. In November 1989, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi (D-Califor-
nia) has put forward a bill, formally known as Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act 
of 1989, to protect Chinese students from deportation back to China after their visas ex-
pired and allow them to remain in the United States legally. Approached first by her Chi-
nese constituents, Pelosi and her staff, with the help from various immigration lawyers, 
quickly drafted the necessary legislation. “Chinese students in touch with these develop-
ments effectively lobbied Pelosi’s office and were told to contact their own members of 
Congress.” (Foot, 2000:125) Although this bill addressed a very tiny area of problems 
caused by the 1989 Tiananmen event, the possible human suffering posed to those tens of 
thousands Chinese students stayed in the United States at the time gained overwhelming 
sympathy and support from the public and the Congress. The popularity of this bill can be 
seen from the unanimous support it gained in the House of Representatives by a passage of 
403-0. (Congress, 1989) Despite its overwhelming support in Congress, President Bush 
chose to use his veto on the bill. And the President has reasoned that such a legislation 
would unnecessarily tie his hands in the conduct of foreign policy and create more tensions 
than peace in U.S.-China relations. But he also stated that he shared the objectives of the 
majority of Congress and had taken actions to protect Chinese students through executive 
order. (Garrison, 2005:119) The White House position has lately been reiterated in more 
detail by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger’s testimony in front of the For-
eign Relations Committee. Mr Eagleburger argued that,
“Obviously, the easy and popular choice for the President would have been to sign the bill 
into law,but there were other considerations. The President could take administrative ac-
tion that would accomplish all of the objectives of the Pelosi bill, yet reduce the likelihood 
of retaliation by the Chinese against exchange programmes with the United States. Accord-
ingly, the President issued a directive that included the substantive measures in the Pelosi 
bill and more. Indeed, some of the protections under the President’s directive, such as the 
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authorisation for employment in this country, are actually broader than those in the Pelosi 
bill.” (Eagleburger, 1990: 9)
With an extensive effort made by the White House, the President has managed to win 
enough votes in the Senate to block the passage of the bill. President Bush, Secretary of 
State Baker, and Chief of Staff John Sununu all lobbied members of Congress, and Richard 
Nixon made phones calls to members of Congress on behalf of the president. (Ross, 2001: 
31) In order to secure the Republican support in particular, the President has made the ar-
gument by saying that, “[t]he bill is totally unnecessary, the long-term policy consequences 
potentially great. Don’t give the Democrats the first perceived victory of the session with 
no substance to justify it…Don’t stop the process [of engaging U.S-China relations]. Don't 
vote with the Democrats and for Pelosi.” (quoted by Garrison, 2005:20) By January 25, 
1990, the bill has failed of passage in the Senate over veto by Yea-Nay vote 62-37. (Con-
gress, 1989) The failure of passage of this bill has certainly spared President Bush from a 
serious political embarrassment, but it can hardly be regarded as a great victory for the !45
president neither. Due to the intricate human cases involved and the bill’s overwhelming 
popularity in Congress, many have left bitterly critical to the White House after the defeat 
in the Senate. “This was a victory for President Bush and the Chinese leadership that was 
responsible for Tiananmen Square,'' said a bitter Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat 
of Massachusetts, after the vote. “It was a defeat for human rights.” (New York Times, 
1990) Those two separate statements made by Senator Kennedy were both false, in a way. 
First, it was not a victory for the President and the Chinese government. For President 
Bush, his stance on human rights issues in relation to China has been further tarnished by 
this use of executive veto on an extremely popular bill. Being seen as a president trying to 
prevent the advancement of human rights practices was not a very helpful image for the 
administration. For the leaders in Beijing, the failure of passage of the bill has not made 
their position after Tiananmen more tenable. Rather, the fierce reaction communicated 
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through the Chinese foreign ministry against the bill has created an unexpected paradox. 
After Beijing missed warning by saying that, “should the U.S. Senate also adopt such a bill, 
it would certainly do serious harm to Sino-U.S. relations and further impair the cultural 
and educational exchanges between the two countries” (the Associated Press, 1990), Sena-
tor Herb Kohl, Democrat of Wisconsin has expressed his disappointment and confusion. 
“Opponents of an override say that China will cut off future exchange programs if the bill is 
enacted. I must admit I am confused by this argument. Why would China accept the policy 
from the President and be outraged if Congress adopts the same plan? It makes no sense, 
unless China thought the regulations would change, but knew that the law would not 
change. And even if China has threatened to cut off exchanges, since when do we let for-
eign governments dictate our own policy?” New York Times, 1990) Indeed, it was unques-
tionably bizarre for the Chinese government to protest against the Congress’s vote on the 
‘Pelosi Bill’ while did not condemn President Bush’s arrangement after the failure of pas-
sage of the bill, which was basically a complete adaptation of the proposed bill. Those 
questions and confusions certainly were not something that both the Bush administration 
and the leaders in Beijing willing to answer at that time. Thus, the failure of passage of the 
‘Pelosi Bill’ could hardly be regarded as a victory for neither the Bush administration nor 
the Communist regime in China.
One the other hand, it was actually not a defeat for human rights at all. First, the 40,000 or 
so Chinese students affected by the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act have not 
been deported back to China because of the failure of passage of the bill in Senate. As the 
President has been promised that special measures have been put in place to ensure that 
core objectives of the bill have been implemented. However, the actual details of the im-
plementation of those measures have been questioned especially on the President’s prom-
ise of the issue of an executive order. (see David Hoffman’s report in Washington Post, 
1990) As Nancy Pelosi has actively protested by saying that, “[i]t’s typical of a syndrome in 
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this administration of 'let's not do anything about it and say we did . . . . Let's say my exec-
utive order will protect the Chinese students but not do one,’"  (ibid.) Nonetheless, despite 
the criticisms over the executive order, there has not been serious cases or crisis related to 
Chinese student’s expired visa occurred. In other words, the human rights of those Chinese 
students which the bill intended to protect has been secured in general. So, it was hardly a 
defeat for human rights in this sense.
Second, regardless of the passage of the bill in the Senate, human rights issue convened 
through the intent to protect those Chinese students in the United States has already re-
ceived a high-profile reception in American politics. This high-level exposure of human 
rights issue in the inter-branch contest between the White House and Congress has en-
sured continuous public attention and further guaranteed human rights issue to become a 
staple in U.S.-China relations debate. As Ms. Pelosi has expressed her feelings that the bat-
tle has not been wasted because the President was forced to publicly affirm that, “no Chi-
nese student in this country is going to be sent back against his or her will”, and  she acute-
ly declared that “[w]ithout this bill we never would have had the executive order and with-
out this veto fight we never would have had this stronger language.” (New York Times, 
1990) Therefore, from this point of view, the failure of passage of the ‘Pelosi Bill’ should 
not be regarded as a defeat for human rights.
2.3 The President’s Reasons for “Defending Beijing”
Although the politics of staging out China’s MFN status issue involved various political 
motivations and calculations by different parties, the unfortunate and unavoidable politi-
cal reality for the Bush administration was its appearance of an image of defending the 
brutal communist dictators in Beijing. The perception of defending a foreign government 
in domestic politics is a very dire warning sign for the current administration, let alone it 
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appeared to defend a Chinese regime governed by the Communist party in a time when the 
Cold War was not yet completely concluded. However, it has  also to be stated that the ac-
tual reasoning behind this ‘defending-Beijing-dictators’ façade was rational and robust. “If 
MFN was not renewed, it could reduce U.S. leverage in market-access and other issues, 
hurt U.S. exports and consumers, damage the nation’s reputation as a reliable trade part-
ner, hurt investors and business in Hong Kong, and set back meaningful reform in 
China.” (Garrison, 2005:117) In terms of strategic rationale, the Cold War was still not 
ended completely and China did in fact still retain its strategic relevance to the United 
States both regionally and globally. 
In his memoirs with Brent Scowcroft, President Bush specifically pointed out the potential 
strategic risks posed by the Soviet Union’s rapprochement with China. Because the Presi-
dent believed that Soviet Union’s goal “was to restore dynamism to a socialist political and 
economic system and revitalise the Soviet Union domestically and internationally to com-
pete with the West.” (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998:13) “[Gorbachev] He was attempting to kill 
us with kindness, rather than bluster. He was saying the sorts of things we wanted to hear, 
making numerous seductive proposals to seized and maintain the propaganda high ground 
in the battle for international public opinion.” (ibid.) Thus, the potential strategic risks 
posed by a warm Sino-Soviet relation were simply too great to be put in a secondary place 
in U.S. foreign policy. And also, “Bush and Scowcroft saw a strong and friendly China as an 
essential part of the administration’s strategy for practical reasons, such as maintaining 
the network of secret U.S. listening posts across China that monitored military develop-
ments in the Soviet Union.” (Garrison, 2005:117) Almost every step made by the Bush ad-
ministration in its relations with China has been calculated to score more points against 
the Soviet Union. While talking about President Bush’s attendance of Japanese Emperor 
Hirohito’s funeral in early 1989, Scowcroft revealed that “the bonus of the trip was the op-
portunity it gave us to stop in Beijing for strategic discussions well before 
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Gorbachev.” (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998:91) And the Bush administration also did not shy 
away from the argument of the possible disappearance of the basis for strategic coopera-
tion between the United States and China after the demise of the Soviet Union. Deputy 
Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has given the administration’s reasoning behind a 
continued U.S.-China cooperation after the disappearance of the Soviet threat in his testi-
mony in front of the Foreign Relations Committee’s hearing on U.S. policy toward China. 
Mr Eagleburger (1990:5) has argued that,
“Indeed, in the eyes of many China’s value to the United States has been as a strategic 
counterweight to the Soviet Union…but that is emphatically not the view of this adminis-
tration…Today…China remains relevant in resolving the conflicts left over from an earli-
er time of Soviet expansionism, but of even greater importance is the fact that, as the 
world’s most populous nation, a country with great economic potential and the possessor 
of a significant military capability, China’s participation is essential to coping successful-
ly with a number of transnational issues…Thus, China’s strategic significance needs to be 
seen not simply through the narrow prism of Soviet factor, but on the far broader scale of 
its place in an increasingly polycentric world.”
Apart from the Soviet Union factor, even if Mr. Eagleburger makes the exact same argu-
ment today, almost three decades later, for sustaining a close relationship with China, it 
would still be valid. China is still the world’s most populous nation. The potentials of its 
economy have been realised by continuous rapid growth over the last 30 years. China still 
maintained its second place in the world in defence spending, although the budget has 
been slowed to single-digit growth in 2016. (Guardian, 2016) 
On the other hand, the political reform which has just been spawned under the leadership 
of Deng Xiaoping since 1979 was another vital component in America’s calculus of China’s 
potential strategic importance to the United States. When Assistant Secretary of State 
Richard Solomon has explained to the U.S. Congress why the White House insist on ex-
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tending China’s MFN status despite continued Chinese inactions, He also “acknowledged 
the administration’s disappointment but suggested that reformers in the Chinese leader-
ship had yet to establish sufficient authority to reciprocate U.S. concessions.” (quoted by 
Ross, 2001: 26) The cultivation of the seeds of reform within China has been a crucial 
component in President Bush’s justifications for his moderate approach to China ranging 
from extending China’s MFN status, approving licences for the sale of satellite compo-
nents, to vetoing Nancy Pelosi’s popular bill regarding Chinese students in America. 
During a congressional hearing conducted by the Committee on Foreign Relations on 
United States Policy toward China, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has 
elaborated in more detail the importance of maintaining this continuous cultivation for 
China’s reform. After stating the administration’s principle of preserving the U.S.-China 
relations in the aftermath of Tiananmen and commending China’s recent modernisation 
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, he argued that,
“One of the features of this period was the deliberate and painstaking effort by people in 
the United States and in China create as broad and deep a set of institutional relation-
ships between our two countries possible…It was precisely with these considerations in 
mind that those who normalised United States-China relations sought to develop quickly 
as many relationships, economic, political, educational, cultural, scientific, athletic, and 
social as possible. Contacts and relationships such as these could only help promote re-
form within China and enhance respect for human rights. Such contacts and relation-
ships could also help to shorten the periods of tension between China and United States 
that experience suggested would likely occur from time to time.” (Eagleburger, 1990: 6)
In the response to popular criticisms of neglecting human rights issues by the Bush admin-
istration, Mr Deputy Secretary stressed that,
“Our effort always has been to try to shorten the time required for China to work its way 
through its internal crisis. No matter how much the current critics of our policy may try 
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to portray it otherwise, the issue has never been whether or how fervently we support re-
form and respect for human rights in China. Of course we support these objectives and 
with as much fervour as our critics. Rather the issue is how best to transform rhetoric 
into reality.” (ibid: 7)
There is not doubt that those statements made by Mr. Eagleburger in front of an aggressive 
congressional committee were a mixture of executive directives, personal preferences and 
political interpretations. However, by taking into account of the President’s own expres-
sions and actions, as we briefly explored previously, it can be argued with confidence that 
the reasoning behind this façade of ‘defending-Beijing’ was not only deliberately construct-
ed, at the President his own risk but also consistent and robust. To put it in a much more 
dramatic but not overly absurd way, President Bush was, in fact, willing to sacrifice his 
own political career to ‘steady the ship’ of the U.S.-China relations forged by his predeces-
sors for almost two decades and ultimately for the greater good of the realisation of Ameri-
ca’s long-term national interests.
2.4 “Coddling Dictators in Beijing” and the Reelection Defeat
Indeed, to say that President Bush has ‘sacrificed’ himself for the greater good of the Unit-
ed States’s national interests is probably overly glorifying the Bush administration’s for-
eign policy achievement. Because for a president of the United States, to protect and secure 
America’s national interest is his primary job. For President Bush, preserving U.S.-China 
relations is only part of his job of protecting America’s national interest. And the decisions 
made by the president to salvage the bilateral relations was not based purely on President 
Bush’s personal believe. The rapidly transforming world of 1989 and early 1990s has limit-
ed the President’s choices and forced him to react promptly to those very challenging 
emergency situations. Apart from problems in China, as Lampton has summarised that, 
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the Bush administration has been occupied primarily with peacefully managing the 
process of the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—“a collapse 
so thorough that by 1996 eleven of the twelve members of the Commonwealth of Indepen-
dent States had suffered anywhere from 20 to 65 percent decrease in GDP”. (Lampton, 
2001:30) Thus, under such global environment of rolling-back communism, many in the 
liberal part of the political spectrum expected Communist China to follow the footsteps of 
its communist brother states to surrender itself to western democracy. 
One strong believer in this view was the young Democratic governor of Arkansas, William 
Jefferson Clinton. As Clinton has firmly believed that, “[o]ne day [China] too will go the 
way of the communist regimes in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The United 
States must do what it can to encourage that process.” (China Business Review, 1993: 18) 
Although the Bush administration has also promoted a process that encourages China to 
deepen its economic and political reforms, the moderation in its reactions to the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown has been interpreted back home as ‘defending’ the Communist gov-
ernment in Beijing. Compounded by the dramatic free fall of the image of China in public 
opinions after Tiananmen, the president’s moderate stance on China became more and 
more untenable domestically. Unsurprisingly, when the 1992 general election commenced, 
the Bush administration’s China policy has become one focused fire area from the Democ-
rats.
For President Bush, the election campaign was centred on two main issues of a slightly im-
proved economy and an outstanding record of foreign policy achievement—ranging from 
peacefully managed the fall of the Soviet Union and a victory in the 1991 Gulf War. For a 
normal general election campaign, the president’s record in office was very impressive in 
both domestic and international grounds. However, the early 1990s was a time of change. 
The Clinton campaign was mainly focused on domestic issues, especially on accelerating 
economic growth and job creation, “music to the ears of a population weary from lagging 
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economic performance and the long twilight struggle of the cold war.” (Lampton, 2001: 32) 
However, by considering the president’s record on the economy, it was not enough for gov-
ernor Clinton to bring the current president down by making just promises on the econo-
my. The Clinton campaign needed a poisoned dagger to stab directly at the back of the ad-
ministration and the issue of human rights was just too perfect to be missed out on the se-
lection of attacking weapons.
In fact, Clinton has saved some of his most “incendiary rhetoric” for attacks against Pres-
ident Bush’s China policy, charging the president with having “coddled the dictators and 
pleaded for progress.” (quoted by Lampton, 2001: 33) In a speech given by candidate Clin-
ton in the ornate Pabst Theatre in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, he has accused President Bush 
of “indifference to democracy”. As Clinton has stated in his speech that,
“He [President Bush] shows little regard for the idea that we must have a principled and 
coherent American purpose in international affairs—something he calls ‘the vision 
thing’…Instead, President Bush seems too often to prefer a foreign policy that embraces 
stability at the expense of freedom—a foreign policy built more around personal relation-
ships with foreign leaders than consideration of how those leaders acquired and main-
tained their power. It is almost as if this administration were nostalgic for a world of 
times past when foreign policy was the exclusive preserve of a few aristocrats.” (Clinton, 
1992)
After reluctantly acknowledging President Bush’s foreign policy accomplishment in the 
Gulf War and the Middle East, in Russia and the Balkans issues, Clinton has turned his at-
tack directly to the president’s China policy. He said that,
“But there is no more striking example of President Bush's indifference to democracy 
than his policy toward China…Instead of allying himself with the democratic movement 
in China, George Bush sent secret emissaries to raise a toast with those who crushed it…
There is much to admire in the phenomenal progress that has been made there. But I be-
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lieve our nation has a higher purpose than to coddle dictators and stand aside from the 
global movement toward democracy.” (ibid)
Although China only occupied just one of the issues that have been raised in Clinton’s criti-
cisms of President Bush’s policy, it was the only case that the candidate has managed to 
paint a damning picture to discredit the president’s moderate approach on China. The con-
struction of the image of the president “coddling dictators in Beijing with a toast” was a 
very powerful and efficient tool for the Clinton campaign to discredit the administration 
and it was almost impossible for President Bush’s camp to dismantle this formidable 
weapon. On the other hand, Clinton’s attacks, though probably partially reflecting sincere 
anger and frustration over Beijing’s behaviour, had “also reflected a tendency in the U.S. 
China debate in the 1990s to use China issues, particularly criticism of China and U.S. poli-
cy toward China, for partisan reasons.” (Sutter, 2013: 105) As a result of this trend, not 
only the president-elect but also most “U.S. politicians in the following years found that 
criticising China and U.S. policy toward China provided a convenient means to pursue 
their political ends.” (ibid.)
On November 4, 1992, Clinton took 43 percent of the popular vote and 68 percent of the 
electoral vote and immediately set about building a new administration. (Lampton, 2001: 
33) The election result was very clear. It has left a huge scar on the out-going president. As 
President Bush later recalled that he felt he had let people down, “there was a generational 
disconnect and the thing that discouraged me was my failure to click with the American 
people on values, duty, and country, service, honour, decency…and they never came 
through…and the media missed it, and the Clinton generation didn’t understand it.” (quot-
ed by Meacham, 2015: 524) The defeat for President Bush was felt “almost like living with 
what I might it would be like to have a cancer—painful—but you can accommodate 
it.” (ibid: 522) Although the reasons for President Bush’s defeat were subjected to various 
debates and post-election analysis, the whole issue of China after 1989 Tiananmen crack-
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down and its connections with human rights has certainly contributed to President Bush’s 
reelection failure. And the “central China policy commitment” that president-elect Clinton 
“has made in the election campaign was that he would find a way to link Chinese access to 
the American market with the improved treatment of its citizens.” (Lampton, 2001: 33) 
And yet little did the newly elected president know that this combination of China and 
human rights issues, which had partially brought his predecessor’s presidency to an end, 
was not a recipe for success for him either.
2.5 Conclusion
It could be concluded that the end of George Bush’s presidency symbolises the end of the 
cold war generation. It was one of the most crucial transition period in the history of U.S.-
China relations. As Harry Harding summarised that, if American China policy seemed to 
be ‘running out of road’ even before the June 4 incident, the maps themselves now appear 
to be woefully outdated descriptions of the contours of the U.S.-China relationship. (Hard-
ing, 1992: 325) Thanks to President Bush’s effort in salvaging the bilateral relationship, 
even with the cataclysmic event like the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, this transition has 
been handled with the utmost care. Although in the global context of the ending of the 
Cold War President Bush’s decision to preserve the bilateral relationship may not sound 
too impressive, I do believe if there was a different president handling this transition, 
things could have gone far worse. Nonetheless, one thing is for certain: the forces of hu-
man rights had been released and it will rampaging through the U.S.-China relationship 
like riptide in next few years.
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Chapter Three: Clinton’s Rollercoaster China Policy and Human Rights
There is an old Chinese saying warning for any takeover of a nation by the powerful that, 
“it is easy to conquer a nation but hard to keep your rule on it.” Or to put it in its English 
equivalent, it should be something similar to the saying that, “it is easy to open a shop but 
hard to keep it open.” The newly elected President Clinton surely has been briefed by his 
team of advisors about the difficulties about being a president before his first day in the 
White House. 
3.1 The Beginning of A Troubled Presidency
On November 18,1992, shortly after the presidential election victory, Clinton has met with 
George Bush in Washington. And many have assumed that they probably discussed China 
policy among many other crucial issues of the time. However, according to George Bush’s 
diary, the president-elect Clinton and Bush had not discussed China at all. In fact, Clinton 
and Bush had “[t]alked at length about Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia, etc., and the 
difficulties that he [Clinton] might anticipate there. I told him I thought that was most like-
ly to be the prime trouble spot. We did not discuss China, and I’m sorry that we didn’t. I 
just forgot it.” (quoted by Meacham, 2015: 525) After the meeting, the president-elect has 
put up a Bush-like statement saying that, “[w]e have a big stake in not isolating China, in 
seeing that China continues to develop a market economy.” (quoted by The Baltimore Sun, 
1992) So how did this Bush-like statement come from if not from the exchange of wisdom 
with George Bush? The most likely explanation for making such a drastically different 
statement on China compared with its relentless rhetoric in criticising Bush’s moderation 
made during the presidential campaign was that the President-elect Clinton said what he 
meant. More specifically, the two most crucial parts of his approach to China had already 
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taken shape in his mind: first, make sure not to isolate China in any way; second, to en-
courage China on its way to developing a market economy which could bring mutual bene-
fit to both the United States and China itself. Given the fact that Clinton himself has little 
to no interest in China affairs in general, those two ‘pillars’ expressed in this statement 
represented the ultimate bottom line of his China policy. In other words, President-elect 
Clinton might not have come up with a well-thought strategy in his policy toward China at 
the beginning, but he was unequivocally clear about what principles his China policy 
should follow.
In line with Clinton’s statement on China, the media has also urged the president-elect to 
stash his China-bashing rhetorics and to “jettison excess campaign baggage more quickly 
and get on with his real job.” (ibid.) Indeed, to utilise the critics on G.H.W Bush’s China 
policy to score points during the presidential election was one thing, to confront problems 
in U.S.-China relations by yourself after you took office was quite another. Although this 
statement did mean little other than calming down the public and disguising the prospect 
of U.S.-China relations in his presidency as business-as-usual and has not been fully re-
flected later in the Clinton administration’s policy toward China, we have to give President 
Clinton the credit for keeping the principle of not isolating China throughout his presiden-
cy. However, this Bush-like principle has raised serious alarm in the human rights com-
munity  and in Clinton’s own party, particularly on Capitol Hill. They saw this remark of 
the president-elect as and early sign of indecision. (Lampton, 2001: 34) This was a sign 
which has been detected not only by domestic politicians but also been picked up by for-
eign powers such the Communist government in China. Thus, “even before his inaugura-
tion, Clinton inadvertently encouraged Beijing and anyone with an interest in China policy 
to push him—and push him they did.” (ibid.) Apart from this principle, Clinton’s China 
policy has constantly been troubled with indecisions. To further complicated those prob-
lems was the fact that the president has little to no interest in China issue or foreign policy 
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area in general. And the power transition in 1992 from G.H.W.Bush to Clinton felt like it 
has been “moved from a man who personally cared about American relations with China to 
one who saw China through the eyes of advisors with competing agendas.” (Tucker, 2001a: 
45) Although the Bush administration made its best effort in preserving the U.S.-China re-
lations from serious disruptions after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, it has not really re-
covered to a level that both sides could continue ‘business as usual’, or rather far from it. 
The ever-mounting pressure from the U.S Congress accumulated during the ‘trench war-
fare’ with the administration over China’s human rights conditions and its MFN status in 
trading with the United States has also been boosted by Clinton camp’s attacks on Bush’s 
China policy during the presidential election period. For the issue of Human Rights, this 
constant exposure and growing momentum since later years of the Bush administration 
and throughout the 1992 election period continued to fuel the course of human rights be-
ing ascended to the forefront of U.S. China policy. As President Clinton has set out a plan 
in his position paper on national security that, 
“U.S. foreign policy cannot be divorced from the moral principles most American share. 
We cannot disregard how other governments treat their won people, whether their do-
mestic institutions are democratic or repressive, whether they help encourage or check 
illegal conduct beyond their borders. It should matter to us how others govern them-
selves. Democracy is our interest.” (Clinton, 1991)
During the transition to power, as Lampton (2001: 33) has pointed out that, an American 
president can greatly enhance or diminish his chances for subsequent foreign policy suc-
cess. In the first few weeks before and after a president assumes office in the White House, 
the new president “makes first impressions and demonstrates inner fortitude (or its ab-
sence) to enemies and friends alike.” (ibid) Thus, it is one thing to forge a beautiful blue-
print, but it is quite another thing to actually make those benign words into concrete reali-
ty. And most importantly, those ideal words might provide avenues for critics to exploit in 
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the future of the presidency. And in the case of the Clinton administration, the president 
has made the future management of U.S.-China relations “exceedingly difficult.” (ibid) 
Nonetheless, at least in words, human rights and democracy promotion occupies a place in 
Clinton’s foreign policy visions. And for the state of bilateral relations between the United 
States and China, however, it was littered with “the debris of failing policies, shattered 
hopes, and partisan warfare.” (Tucker, 2001a:45) Although it is no uncommon for a new 
president to inherit a troublesome foreign policy legacy from his predecessor, U.S.-China 
relations is not the kind of foreign relationship that could be left in a state of disrepair dur-
ing a time of rapid change. 
By early 1990s, with the loosening of economic sanctions imposed by the West after 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown, China’s rapid economic progress was gaining momentum from the 
deepening of its economic reforms. For instance, in 1992, the 14th Communist Party Na-
tional Congress has introduced an overall plan for furthering market-oriented reforms. Ac-
cording to a recent research carried out by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, six ma-
jor fields of economic reforms have performed remarkably in accordance with this strategy 
from 1991 onwards, including fiscal reforms, reforms in the financial sector, exchange rate 
reforms, establishing a market-based prudential system, encouraging private investment 
and reform governmental structure and legal system. (Yang, 2013) As a result of Beijing’s 
determination for economic reforms, China has become a real powerhouse for global eco-
nomic growth. By 1993, “China had attracted 27 billion USD in foreign direct investment, 
second only to the United States that had accrued 32 billion USD in investment from for-
eign sources in that year. After Hong Kong and Taiwan, the United States also became the 
biggest investor in China.” (Wang, 2010: 185) This ‘new reality’ of China’s increased power 
produced new challenges and pressures on the United States’s China policy. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, China’s potentials of rapid economic growth in the forthcoming 
decade was a predicted event that the Bush administration has foreseen and prepared for 
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in its dealings with China. To secure U.S. economic interest in China was also one of the 
major reasons that the Bush administration insisted to pursue a moderate approach in its 
China policy after the 1989 Tiananmen event despite its serious political ramifications. 
Thus, for a bilateral relationship so crucial that the previous government tried its best to 
preserve should also be on the forefront of the new president’s foreign policy agenda. 
However, it was not the case when President Clinton took office in the White House in 
1992. 
Once in office, the President’s first move in his China policy was to link trade status to 
progress in human rights as the central element of U.S. policy toward China, “noting that if 
a government does not protect the rights of its citizens and follow the rule of law, then it 
cannot be trusted in commercial relations.” (Garrison, 2005:133) For the Communist gov-
ernment in Beijing, after nervously witnessed the defeat of their old acquaintance George 
Bush in the presidential election, it was a very unsettling situation when the new presi-
dent’s first move was to humiliate China on its human rights practices and at the same 
time sabotaging the most crucial aspect of the bilateral relations between the United States 
and China—trade relations. For human rights, however, it was the absolute opposite of this 
dire situation in U.S.-China relations. Ever since the explosion of publicity after the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown, with the help from domestic and international pressure groups, 
human rights has been steadily gaining grounds in U.S. China policy. With President Clin-
ton’s decision of linking China’s human rights conditions with its trade status in the United 
States, the issue of human rights has finally reached the pinnacle of policies in U.S.-China 
relations competing with the most crucial interest of them all—economic interest hand in 
hand. So why did the newly elected Clinton administration choose to link China’s human 
rights conditions with its trade status in the United States at a time when China’s economy 
was booming? The following parts will try to answer this incredibly complex question 
about the decision-making in Clinton’s China policy.
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3.2 The President and His Foreign Policy team
Many previous studies have already shown that at the highest level of the Clinton adminis-
tration there was a collective lack of interest in U.S. policy toward China. First and fore-
most, President Clinton himself was not a big fan of China policy and foreign policy in gen-
eral. As many studies have concluded that once Clinton has won the presidential election 
from the ‘incumbent’ George Bush and was in office, he had shown little interest in China 
policy, leaving the responsibility of constructing this crucial policy to his subordinates. 
(Sutter, 2013: 105-6; Mann, 1999: 274) This kind of ‘negligence’ certainly does not neces-
sarily mean that President Clinton was incompetent in the foreign policy area. Rather, it 
showed that, compared with his predecessor George Bush, foreign policy was not President 
Clinton’s forte and he chose not focus too much energy in this area. As Tucker has pointed 
out that, although Clinton had studied at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Ser-
vice and interned with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had long since left be-
hind any interest in foreign affairs, freeing his team of foreign policy advisors and analysts 
to imbue the presidential campaign’s domestic and international platform with its own 
values and priorities. (Tucker, 2001a: 47) As we can see through the events of the 1990s in 
retrospect (two decades later), such a lack of interest in foreign policy by the president 
himself and the lack of leadership in this area has resulted in a tattered and inconsistent 
foreign policy for Clinton’s presidency. There is also a consensus in the academic judge-
ments on Clinton’s foreign policy. As many have viewed the Clinton administration as 
“squandering the inheritance from Bush Senior, and as bequeathing to Bush Junior an 
America that was exceedingly vulnerable to ‘borderless threats’…He is frequently judged to 
have been reactive, subordinating foreign policy coherence to the perceived needs of do-
mestic agendas.” (Dumbrell, 2005: 2) For Henry Kissinger, he has made a very common 
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complaint about Clinton’s foreign policy as a less grand design and “a series of seemingly 
unrelated decisions in response to specific crises.” (quoted by The Economist, 2000) This 
observation has also been echoed by W.G.Hyland: “In the absence of an overall perspec-
tive, most issues were bound to degenerate into tactical manipulations, some successful 
[and] some [were] not.” (Hyland, 1999: 203) After the publication of his biography “My 
Life” in 2004, Clinton’s personal character has also been linked to his indecisions in for-
eign policy during his presidency. The New York Times has reviewed Clinton’s biography 
as “a mirror of Mr. Clinton’s presidency: lack of discipline leading to squandered opportu-
nities; high expectations, undermined by self-indulgence and scattered 
concentration.” (quoted by The Financial Times, 2004) Here are many allegations made 
about Clinton’s foreign policy by those distinguished scholars and commentators. We will 
narrow them down into Clinton’s China policy in more specific detail in later parts of this 
chapter. But for now, with the help of those previous studies, it can be concluded with con-
fidence that President Clinton’s lack of interest in foreign policy was one of the major 
sources for his inconsistent China policy.
Although President Clinton’s foreign policy advisors and analysts were much better ‘quali-
fied’ in foreign policy making compared with the president himself in terms of experience 
and knowledge, without the leadership, things can only get worse. Garrison has pointed 
out that the initial foreign policy team put together by the president in his first term was 
“comprised of a familiar group of Democrats-in-waiting” and have little interest in China 
affairs. (Garrison, 2005: 134-5) For instance, both Secretary of State Warren Christopher 
and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake had held positions in the Carter administra-
tion as Deputy Secretary of State and as Director of Policy planning. The national security 
advisor would be a neutral arbiter bringing options to the president, while the secretary of 
state was the administration’s chief foreign policy spokesman. (ibid.) Both of these two 
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posts have helped to shape the core of the president’s foreign policy. And both were not big 
‘fans’ of China.
For Warren Christopher, one particular event had a very negative impact on his view on 
China affairs. He has been sent to Taipei as Deputy Secretary of State together with a small 
diplomatic team shortly after the normalisation of U.S.-China relations had been an-
nounced in December 1978. “He spoke at that time with Taiwan’s President Chiang Ching-
kuo, explaining why Washington had established formal diplomatic relations with Beijing 
and informing Chiang that ties with Taipei would henceforth be ‘unofficial’.” (Lampton, 
2001: 35) Due to the sensitivity of this official mission to the Republic of China, Christo-
pher and his diplomatic team has not been welcomed upon their arrival in Taipei. As 
Christopher has recalled in his memoir that, “I suspected I was in for non-stop verbal 
abuses. As things played out, I was undershot the mark.” (Christopher, 2001: 91) Accord-
ing to the Washington Post report of the time, “[t]he Christopher party was met on arrival 
in Taipei Wednesday night by 6,000 to 10,000 angry demonstrators who hurled eggs, 
tomatoes, mud and rocks at the U.S. officials and smashed their automobile windshields 
with bamboo sticks. During their stay, a Taiwanese set himself on fire to protest the U.S. 
action and the newspaper China News said another chopped off his left index finger and 
wrote ‘I love my country’ in blood on a piece of white linen.” (The Washington Post, 1978) 
This unfortunate but predictable event in Taipei had left a significant impact on Christo-
pher’s interest in China affairs. “From that time on, Secretary Christopher never gave the 
impression that he enjoyed his China experiences much, whether in Taipei or 
Beijing.” (Lampton, 2001: 35) His uneasy experience with the Chinese has later been re-
peated on the other side of the Taiwan Strait in his 1994 trip to Beijing as the Secretary of 
State under Clinton. After being shunned by the Communist government from meeting 
President Jiang, Christopher has sent a diplomatic note that night to President Clinton 
saying his hosts had been “rough, somber, sometime bordering on the insolent.” (Christo-
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pher, 2001: 239) As a whole, “I had arrived in China at a moment when a U.S. secretary of 
state was a convenient punching bag.” (ibid.) Furthermore, despite the utmost diplomatic 
efforts made by Secretary Christopher to secure a successful meeting with President Jiang, 
the American media back home had summed up his trip as a “diplomatic mugging”. (ibid: 
241) With all of those unpleasant events in mind, no wonder Secretary Christopher tended 
to shy away from China affairs as much as possible during his year as the chief diplomat of 
the Clinton administration.
Apart from the fact that Anthony Lake has not even been to China before taking the job as 
National Security Advisor to President Clinton, his lack of interest on China issues was in-
fluenced by a much ‘deeper’ reason. As the head of the National Security Council, Anthony 
Lake believed in democratic enlargement and viewed the post-Cold War era as one in 
which the American power should be used not only to secure ‘realist’ national interests but 
also to promote more democratic and humane governance around the world. (Lampton, 
2001: 35) As for undemocratic nations such as China, Iraq, Iran and etc., Lake categorised 
them as the ‘Backlash’ States, which “tend to rot from within both economically and spiri-
tually.” (Lake, 1993) The United States toward those ‘Backlash States’, “so long as they act 
as they do, must seek to isolate them diplomatically, militarily, economically, and techno-
logically.” (ibid) The only way for them be accepted into the international community was 
through democratisation. As for the United States relations with the People’s Republic of 
China specifically, 
“We cannot impose democracy on regimes that appear to be opting for liberalisation, but 
we may be able to help steer some of them down that path while providing penalties that 
raise the costs of repression and aggressive behaviour. These efforts have special mean-
ing for our relations with China. That relationship is one of the most important in the 
world, for China will increasingly be a major world power, and along with our ties to 
Japan and Korea, our relationship with China will strongly shape both our security and 
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economic interests in Asia. It is in the interest of both our nations for China to continue its 
economic liberalisation while respecting the human rights of its people and international 
norms regarding weapons sales. That is why we conditionally extended China's trading 
advantages, sanctioned its missile exports and proposed creation of a new Radio Free 
Asia. We seek a stronger relationship with China that reflects both our values and our in-
terests.” (ibid.)
In a broader sense, Lake’s statement on China policy has reflected the Wilsonian liberalism 
which had heavily influenced President Clinton’s foreign policy vision. Based on a Kantian 
democratic peace tradition, the Clinton administration believed that the only way to guar-
antee global peace was through a process of democratic enlargement. Because real democ-
racies do not go to war with each other. The only justification for conflict between democ-
racies would be the populace mandate granted from the citizens who choose to bear the 
burdens of war. Thus, for Clinton’s solution, one obvious way in preventing conflict is 
through increasing the number of democracies around the world. The Clinton administra-
tion thought that “building on the old Wilsonian gospel…was that such an [democratic] 
expansion would encourage an upward cycle of global peace and prosperity, serving Amer-
ican interests and allowing the United States to de-emphasize its own military 
strength.” (Dueck, 2003: 6) This view of democratic enlargement has later been developed 
into the so-called Clinton Doctrine—“intervention to relieve suffering and protect the dis-
enfranchised in the world community.” (Tucker, 2001a: 47)
The other side of the democratic enlargement argument is economics. Because for Clinton 
and his advisors, there was a particularly natural logic connection between democratic 
freedom and economic liberalism. In this perspective, it is quite obvious that international 
conflict is found to be detrimental to global trade and economy. Citizens enjoy the benefits 
of free and open trade and thus understand that war and conflict restrict their access to 
foreign commodities. (Apodaca, 2006: 134) This link between democracy and market 
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economy is a very persuading argument to support the Wilsonian liberalism ideology that 
the president and his advisory team attempted to push in the foreign policy area. This part 
of the argument has also been stated very clearly in the beginning of Anthony Lake’s 
speech at John Hopkins University.
“This [Cold War] victory of freedom is practical, not ideological: billions of people on 
every continent are simply concluding, based on decades of their own hard experience, 
that democracy and markets are the most productive and liberating ways to organise 
their lives. Their conclusion resonates with America's core values. We see individuals as 
equally created with a God-given right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. So we 
trust in the equal wisdom of free individuals to protect those rights: through democracy, 
as the process for best meeting shared needs in the face of competing desires; and 
through markets as the process for best meeting private needs in a way that expands op-
portunity. Both processes strengthen each other: democracy alone can produce justice, 
but not the material goods necessary for individuals to thrive; markets alone can expand 
wealth, but not that sense of justice without which civilised societies perish.” (Lake, 1993)
Unsurprisingly, to practically apply this profound liberal idealism to a realism-dominated 
foreign policy area, you will not go too far, as the Carter administration proved to be a 
prime example. To reinforce the success chance of this Wilsonian idealism, Lake has 
brought in many like-minded people into President Clinton’s foreign policy team, mostly 
notably Winston Lord. Lord has been appointed as the Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs in 1993 and was put in de facto charge of an interagency group 
composed of representatives from the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence 
Agency, Department of Defence, United States Trade Representative, Department of 
Treasury, Department of Commerce and the Office of the Vice President. (Lampton, 2001: 
38) Lord has been involved in U.S. China policy since Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to 
Beijing in 1971. “Lord knew the intricacies of the bilateral relationship and the key Chinese 
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personalities.” (ibid.) However, apart from his diplomatic credentials on China  affairs, 
Lord has also been a prominent voice in criticising the Communist government in Beijing 
and its dealings on human rights issues. He was deeply critical of the Chinese leadership 
after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. In his lengthy article in Foreign Affairs, Lord has 
“spoken out strongly against the actions of the Chinese regime since the spring [1989], as it 
proceeded from intransigence to massacre, from roundups to executions and repression, 
all cloaked in a most brazen display of the Big Lie.” (Lord, 1989: 2) Lord later explained his 
condemnation by saying that, “I assign a higher priority to human rights than Kissinger 
does, not only because of the virtues and values of human rights and idealism, and the 
need to maintain congressional support, but also because it is in China’s self-interest to 
emphasise respect for human rights. China cannot develop its economy without a freer so-
ciety, because this is the age of information…[therefore] the protection and promotion of 
human rights should be an important part of our policy.” (quoted by Tucker, 2001b: 454) 
And he still held his position during a conference organised by the Foreign Affairs 
magazine 25 years after the 1989 Tiananmen incident. (Foreign Affairs, 2014) His firm 
commitment to the cause of human rights has boosted his credibility with Congress which 
became a precious asset for him later in the MFN linkage saga. Nevertheless, Lord’s Wilso-
nian idealism meshed with Lord’s strong views on human rights together with an ‘un-
enthusiastic’ Warren Christopher as their chief, this group of ‘principled engagement’ ad-
vocates—advocating human rights agenda in U.S.-China relations—has convinced Presid-
ent Clinton that, by holding China to high human rights standards, both economic and 
democratic goals could be achieved simultaneously. (Tucker, 2001a: 48) Thus, the presid-
ent and his trusted foreign policy team had boxed themselves into a course of linking 
China’s MFN status in the U.S. with its human rights conditions, which had never been 
and probably will never be achieved by any U.S. president before or after.
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3.3 The Debacle of Human Rights and China’s MFN Status Linkage
Linking China’s MFN trading status in the United States with its human rights conditions 
is not a new phenomenon in U.S.-China relations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, 
the Bush administration has repeatedly defeated Congress’s attempt to make this linkage 
possible. Due to the Bush administration’s determination of preserving U.S. business in-
terest in China and the overall bilateral relationship, the annual MFN status renewal has 
not developed into a uncontainable eruption of troubles, although President Bush’s posi-
tion of defending against this linkage has been significantly weakened during the election 
year of 1992. Nevertheless, China’s MFN trade status has been renewed annually without 
additional conditions attached to it. However, the newly elected Clinton administration set 
out to blow this issue wide open.
In the early days of the Clinton administration, the White House has approached members 
of Congress, such as Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), and Senate majority leader 
George Mitchell (D-Me.), who were determined to challenge annual approval of MFN sta-
tus for China. Rather than encouraging them to forward a bill to Congress, “Clinton’s mes-
sengers [have] convinced them to step aside and allow the president to issue an executive 
order linking Beijing’s human rights behaviour to renewal of commercial privileges in 
1994.” (ibid.) On May 28, 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 128590, “Condi-
tions for Renewal of Most-Favoured-Nation Status for the People’s Republic of China in 
1994”. (National Archives, 1993) In his speech in the White House Rose Garden accompa-
nied by key figures from Congress including Pelosi and Mitchell, President Clinton gave 
reasons for issuing this executive order. Clinton stated that,
“The annual battles between Congress and the Executive divided our foreign policy and 
weakened our approach over China. It is time that a unified American policy recognise 
both the value of China and the values of America. Starting today, the United States will 
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speak with one voice on China policy. We no longer have an executive branch policy and 
a congressional policy. We have an American policy…The core of this policy will be a res-
olute insistence upon significant progress on human rights in China. To implement this 
policy, I am signing today an Executive order that will have the effect of extending most-
favoured-nation status for China for 12 months. Whether I extend MFN next year, how-
ever, will depend upon whether China makes significant progress in improving its hu-
man rights record. The order lays out particular areas I will examine, including respect 
for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the release of citizens imprisoned for 
the nonviolent expression of their political beliefs, including activists imprisoned in con-
nection with Tiananmen Square. The order includes China's protection of Tibet's religious 
and cultural heritage and compliance with the bilateral U.S.-China agreement on prison 
labor.” (Clinton, 1993)
This move has set the deadline for Clinton’s foreign policy team to put forward an agreed-
upon China policy. At the same time, it has also sparked an internal warfare among con-
flicting interest groups within the administration. The whole process of constructing a co-
herent China policy before the president to notify Congress about his intention concerning 
the renewal of China’s MFN trading status “was characterised by the lack of presidential 
involvement (until rather late), ceaseless negotiations with committed members of Con-
gress, parallel attempts to obtain Chinese human rights concessions that would justify un-
conditional extension of MFN, and the development of conditions for MFN extension in 
the event that Beijing did not yield.” (Lampton, 2001: 39) As this policy construction 
process continued, various government agencies and different interest groups sought to 
influence policy to their particular ends. For instance, business interests found allies in the 
National Economic Council, the United States Trade Representative, the Department of 
Commerce, the Department of Treasury under Lloyd Bentsen, and other trade-related 
committees of the Congress. (ibid.: 40) On the other side, human rights and other interest 
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groups who favoured a tough approach on China and the MFN linkage found their back-
ings from the State Department (Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shat-
tuck), selected individuals on the National Security Council (Anthony Lake and Nancy 
Soderberg), highly motivated members of Congress (Nancy Pelosi and George Mitchell), 
and some of the president’s personal staff, as well as the mass media. (ibid.) To further 
their positions, both sides have made some bold moves to make their voices heard.
Commercial officials have used “what leverage they could to weaken” the pro-linkage 
group’s position “from late 1993 through the first quarter of 1994, in order to avoid a con-
frontation with China that would undercut long-term trade prospects.” (Garrison, 2005: 
139) For example, in a public interview just before the New Year, U.S. Ambassador to 
China J. Stapleton Roy said that “the setbacks in human rights represented by the 
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 and the wave of repression that followed were being 
steadily reversed, and that the Communist Party had loosened its control over many as-
pects of Chinese life. He argues that Beijing has made ‘dramatic’ progress in improving the 
lives of its citizens and that this record should be taken into account when policy toward 
China is reviewed early in the new year.” (The New York Times, 1994a) Although the Am-
bassador has also stressed that he could not predict whether China would satisfy the 
standard of "overall significant progress” set out by the executive order, his opposition to 
the MFN linkage was very clear. Roy stated that, “[a]t the core of our approach is not the 
idea that we can somehow get beyond the human rights factor in our relationship with 
China. Rather, it is a question of what is the most effective way to press human rights con-
cerns while conducting normal diplomacy on crucial Asian security issues.” (ibid.) Such 
public comments from a senior diplomat had encouraged the ‘business’ side of the admin-
istration, namely the Department of Commerce and Treasury and the National Economic 
Council, “to break ranks and push for MFN independently of human rights.” (Garrison, 
2005: 139) As a side note, former Assistant Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger has 
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also pointed out that American diplomats were becoming frustrated at the President’s not 
defining what he means by ‘overall significant progress’ in the executive order. (The New 
York Times, 1994b)
Shortly after Ambassador Roy’s comments made public, “the State Department's top hu-
man rights official met privately with China's most prominent dissident in the first such 
encounter with a Clinton Administration official since the dissident was freed last year 
after serving 14 and a half years in prison for advocating democracy. The official, John 
Shattuck, an Assistant Secretary of State, agreed to take a message from the dissident, Wei 
Jingsheng, to President Clinton urging him to maintain economic pressure on Beijing as 
the best way to win the release of political prisoners.” (ibid.) It was a diplomatic bombshell 
dropped on the already troubled U.S.-China relationship. In response, Chinese Premier Li 
Peng and other Chinese leaders blasted U.S. human rights policy and accused Shattuck of 
interfering in China’s internal affairs. (Garrison, 2005: 39) This was the time when Secret-
ary of State Warren Christopher flew to Beijing to seek concessions for the MFN renewal 
conditions. It was ‘the perfect time for being a punching bag’ remarks we have mentioned 
before. In his memoirs, Christopher was deeply disappointed that representatives of Amer-
ican companies in China had blasted him for pressing the Chinese on human rights the day 
after he arrived in Beijing. “These men were in China to further their companies’ business 
interests, and they clearly felt my message threatened that mission. Though I understood 
their frustration, I was dismayed by their words. We were all, first and foremost, repres-
entatives of the most successful democracy on earth. If we abandoned the effort to pro-
mote the hallmark of democracy, the importance of individual civil rights, what would dis-
tinguish us from the undemocratic?” (Christopher, 2001: 240)
Despite the relentless efforts made by the pro-trade groups to reject the linkage, without 
sufficient concessions from the Chinese government on its human rights practices, very 
little progress has been achieved. The real big crack, however, first occurred within the 
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pro-linkage side. From the beginning, President Clinton  himself was not fully committed 
to linkage argument. According to Lampton (2001: 42), the president began to express his 
doubts about the MFN human rights linkage as early as 1993 his trip to Japan and South 
Korea. He was advised about how to be effective in an Asian context from East Asians who 
were concerned about deteriorating U.S.-China relations. By mid-July, Winston Lord pre-
pared a classified memorandum to the president calling for “comprehensive engagement”, 
a policy that was approved in September that year and gave a name to a slow-motion 
change in the administration’s China policy. (ibid.) Two things need to be broken down in 
more detail here. First, President Clinton’s ‘duplicity’ on the whole linkage issue was not 
freshly new. In fact, in his speech after the issuing of Executive Order 128590, President 
Clinton spent almost half of his speech in stressing China’s crucial position in U.S. policies. 
Apart from the usual ‘democratic enlargement’ argument to “ensure China abides by in-
ternational standards”, there were two other purposes for the issue of the executive order. 
One was that President Clinton intended to unite Congress with the White House as much 
as possible through this executive order in the hope of producing a coherent China policy. 
As the president confidently expressed that, 
“Starting today, the United States will speak with one voice on China policy. We no 
longer have an executive branch policy and a congressional policy. We have an American 
policy…I intend to continue working closely with Congress as we pursue our China poli-
cy…I intend to put the full weight of the Executive behind this order. I know I have Con-
gress's support.” (Clinton, 1993) 
The other point, which has usually been overlooked, was that the president raised the issue 
of China alleged sales of M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan, which was a serious violation of 
the rules of Missile Technology Control Regime. President Clinton stated that,
“Existing U.S. law provides for strict sanctions against nations that violate these guide-
lines. We have made our concerns on the M-11 issue known to the Chinese on numerous 
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occasions. They understand the serious consequences of missile transfers under U.S. 
sanctions law. If we determine that China has in fact transferred M-11 missiles or related 
equipment in violation of its commitments, my administration will not hesitate to 
act.” (ibid.)
In other words, the issue of the Executive Order 128590 was made during a time of serious 
U.S. strategic concerns over China’s weapons proliferation. It can be reasonably assumed 
that the executive order of linking China’s MFN trade status with its human rights prac-
tices, which was an undependable weakness on the Communist government’s part, has be 
used as an official warning or deterrence to Beijing for stopping its ballistic missiles sales 
to Pakistan or any other countries that may pose strategic threat to the American interest 
in the Asia and Pacific region. Later, Washington imposed sanctions on Beijing in August 
that year for this arms sale to Pakistan. And the next month, the U.S. Navy tracked and 
demanded inspection of a Chinese cargo ship bound for Iran that U.S. intelligence agencies 
suspected of carrying chemical weapons “precursors”. (Lampton, 2001: 42) Thus, the issu-
ing of the executive order can ben seen as part of a coordinated strategy to punish Beijing’s 
behaviour on the serious issue of weapons proliferation. It also means that once the Chi-
nese government restrained itself from further weapons sales to certain countries, the 
United States has no reason to continue to punishing Beijing for its past deeds and provok-
ing unnecessary tensions between the two countries. With those arguments in mind, Pres-
ident Clinton’s ‘duplicity’ on the MFN linkage decision afterwards was not difficult to un-
derstand.
On the other hand, Assistant Secretary Winston Lord has not been 100% committed to the 
MFN linkage policy from the beginning either. Although he had held particularly strong 
views on the Communist regime in Beijing since the 1989 Tiananmen incident, Lord had 
also maintained equally strong support for the ‘old friends’ in Beijing. In the article written 
shortly after the Tiananmen event, Lord relentlessly condemned the Communist regime’s 
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reaction to Tiananmen while urging everyone to keep their faith in the future of a better 
Chinese government. Lord stated that,
“I believe that especially those of us who have worked for Sino-American relations need 
to speak to—and for—the vast legions of the Chinese people, including not only those who 
are purged, vilified and silenced, but also those in leading positions who once more must 
swallow their convictions and regurgitate the current party line. Surely these ‘old friends’ 
deserve our loyalty more than the handful of those responsible for crushing Chinese spir-
its. I am persuaded that in the relatively near future there will once again be a Chinese 
regime composed of people with whom we can resume the forward march in our rela-
tionship.” (Lord, 1989: 2)
Because of this strong belief in the friendly forces within the Communist party and the 
Chinese people as a whole, Lord’s position on the MFN linkage issue has always been trou-
bled with contradictions. Commenting on the Bush administration’s approach on China’s 
MFN status, Lord had made his contradictions explicit. Lord argued that,
“I felt that, on the one hand, we should not revoke MFN status for China…there was much 
substance to the argument that you can encourage a society by engaging and by opening 
our relations…If we cut off MFN status, we would be cutting off the performers and busi-
ness people who were working in the direction we wished…On the other hand, I was in-
creasingly frustrated with what I thought was the overly soft approach toward China by 
the Bush administration and the fact that we didn’t seem to have any leverage with Chi-
na.” (quoted by Tucker, 2001b: 453)
And on President Clinton’s decision to link the MFN status with China’s human rights, 
Lord recalled that,
“I came out in favour of what I considered modest conditions for an extension of MFN 
status for China. The point here was to lay out some objectives, sufficiently concrete to be 
meaningful, but not so specific and detailed that we would box ourselves in. We would 
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have some leverage on the Chinese because of their trade surplus with the U.S. and be-
cause of the importance of trade to them.” (ibid: 454)
Therefore, when Beijing remained confident that the business card will ultimately over-
come those political obstacles, Lord and other pro-linkage group started to disintegrate no 
the fragile unity built for the MFN linkage argument. After Secretary of State Christopher’s 
failed trip to Beijing in March 1994, pro-linkage supporters such as Lake, Berger, Lord and 
Shattuck were convinced that a change in tactics was needed. (Garrison, 2005: 139) The 
best way they could come up at that time to minimise the damage caused by this linkage 
policy was to initiate contact with the Communist government in Beijing. For example, 
Lake met with the Chinese Ambassador to the United States Li Daoyu at Richard Nixon’s 
funeral in April 1994 to secure last-minute concession necessary to justify MFN renewal. 
(ibid.:140) And Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Michael Armacost has been sent to 
China as a special presidential envoy with the proposal that if the Chinese made enough 
minor gestures to cover the executive order, the Clinton administration would permanent-
ly drop the linkage. (ibid.) So how and why did the pro-linkage group and the president 
prepare to ditch the linkage between economic interest and human rights so quickly after 
less a year since the issuing of the Executive Order 128590? The short answer is “the eco-
nomics, stupid.” Or as Lampton mildly put it that, the error of judgement made by Presi-
dent Clinton and his foreign policy team has dragged the U.S.-China relations into an 
“equivalent of a hellish Hieronymus Bosch  [a medieval Dutch painter famous for his 
macabre and nightmarish depictions of hell] painting.” (Lampton, 2001: 42) 
After the announcement of the executive order in 1993, the Communist government in Bei-
jing had already started to develop a multi-level strategy to minimise the economic impact 
a possible loss of MFN status in the United States might cause. The essence of the strategy 
was to compensate the possible economic loss with expanding trade relations with big 
economies other than the United States. When U.S.-China relations was in peril because of 
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the MFN linkage issue, other Western economise had taken full commercial advantages of 
the situation. For instance, in November 1993, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has 
secured nearly $2 billion in contracts for German industry during his visit to China. 
(Chicago Tribune, 1993) The Chancellor has concluded during a news conference that, “[i]t 
is left to every country to make its own decision (on China)…After all, we do compete with 
each other on international markets. Sometimes we get the contracts, sometimes our 
friends do. It looks as if we have been successful this time.” (ibid.) Unsurprisingly, after the 
Germans, came the French. The French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur has visited Chi-
na in April 1994 and achieved not a resumed bilateral relationship, which was disrupted by 
France’s arms sale to Taiwan previously, but also advance the Franco-China economic re-
lationship. (French Public Service Website, 1994) And according to the Washington Post 
(1994), in an indication of warming ties, Li told Balladur that China plans to import $1 tril-
lion worth of goods from foreign countries in the next seven years to meet the demands of 
the world's fastest-growing economy and that, "France may get some of this expanded 
trade.” And for China’s trade relations with its neighbour Japan, Japanese Prime Minister 
Hosokawa has announced that “in 1993 Japan-China trade had grown to $38 billion, mak-
ing China Japan’s second largest trading partner (after the U.S., at $161 billion).” (Britan-
nica, 1994)
Faced with this wave of economic enthusiasm from America’s closest allies, the pro-linkage 
group was dismayed and anxious about the diminishing U.S. economic influence over Chi-
na. As Winston Lord later bluntly criticised those countries by saying that, “[w]e want Eu-
ropean and Japanese and other help on nonproliferation, trade, or human rights. Good 
luck. We try very hard, they hold out coats while we take on the Chinese and they gobble 
up the contracts.” (Lord, 1996) In an attempt to prevent further damage to the trade rela-
tions with China and American business interests in the country, large communities of ma-
jor multinational corporations had launched “one of the largest lobby efforts ever” to per-
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suade President Clinton to renew China's preferential trade status and separate the issue 
from human rights concerns, according to the Washington Post’s report. (1994b) “Nearly 
800 major companies and trade associations have written [to] Clinton, asserting that a 
rupture of trade relations with China would sacrifice billions of dollars in business, elimi-
nate tens of thousands of U.S. jobs and set back the cause of human rights.” (ibid.) Al-
though there were some resentment from within the administration and Congress, the 
overwhelming force expressed from the business community was simply ‘invincible’. 
In a widely circulated memo to the Secretary of State Warren Christopher, titled as 
“Emerging Malaise in our Relations with Asia”, Winston Lord stated that, “[a] series of 
American measures threatened or employed, risk corroding our positive image in the re-
gion [of Asia Pacific], giving ammunition to those charging we are an international nanny, 
if not bully. Without proper course adjustments, we could subvert our influence and our 
interests.” (Lord, 1994) Finally, in late March 1994, the policy of linking China’s MFN sta-
tus renewal with its human rights conditions has collapsed and “was buried at a meeting in 
the White House as Christopher conceded its unworkability.” (Tucker, 2001a: 53) In the 
following month, with a little help from the Chinese government with enough minor con-
cessions, President Clinton had managed to attain enough room to de-link MFN and seek a 
compromise with congressional democrats. (Garrison, 2005: 140) On May 26, 1994, Presi-
dent Clinton has announced his decision to renew China’s MFN status for 1994 and aban-
don the linkage between trade status and China’s human rights conditions which has been 
set out in the Executive Order 125890 issued a year before. Rather than publicly admitting 
defeat, the president spun the decision into a victory of the cause of human rights. Clinton 
argued that,
“I believe the question, therefore, is not whether we continue to support human rights in 
China but how we can best support human rights in China and advance our other very 
significant issues and interests. I believe we can do it by engaging the Chinese. I believe 
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the course I have chosen gives us the best chance of success on all fronts. We will have 
more contacts. We will have more trade. We will have more international cooperation. 
We will have more intense and constant dialog on human rights issues. We will have that 
in an atmosphere which gives us the chance to see China evolve as a responsible power, 
ever growing not only economically but growing in political maturity so that human 
rights can be observed.” (Clinton, 1994)
Ironically, the president was confronted by a journalist asking whether he was ‘coddling’ 
with the tyrants in Beijing, a notorious accusation made by Clinton during the 1992 presi-
dential election against George Bush. President Clinton initially dodged the question and 
replied directly when the question has been asked again. The president said that,
“No, because I do believe what happened—what has happened since then [after Tianan-
men]? Has there been any progress [in China]? There's been so much progress that even 
the people who have supported these strong resolutions, the legislation in the past are 
now arguing for a different course. I'm not the only person arguing that the time has 
come to take a different path; it's that they will say, well, I should have done something 
else. But virtually everyone says the time has come to move out of the framework now…
And I expect that many people who criticise my decision will say, ‘Well, he should have 
put stiffer tariffs on something or another or should have had a bigger section of the 
economy affected or gone after the military enterprises or something like that.’ But I 
think nearly everybody recognises that there has been some real change in this and that 
we have the chance to move it to a different and better plan. And I think what I'm doing is 
the right thing to do.” (ibid.)
In an attempt to show solidarity with the president, National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake claimed that the President's strong stance during the 1992 campaign and last year 
had "allowed us to achieve the progress that has been achieved this year" in focusing Bei-
jing's attention on human rights. (quoted by the New York Times, 1994c) Apart from the 
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normal political spin, Lake’s justification for the positive result for raising human rights 
awareness was valid. There has never been such a ‘bonanza’ of human rights debate being 
discussed at the highest level of America’s China policy making  since the normalisation of 
the bilateral relations. Compounded with the ending of the Cold War, the 1989 Tiananmen 
crackdown has sparked an explosion of debates over China’s human rights in the United 
States. Although the previous Bush administration continuously resisted the advancement 
of human rights into interfering other foreign policy objectives in China affairs, the mo-
mentum was unstoppable. Once President Clinton issued the executive order to link Chi-
na’s human rights conditions with its trade status in the United States, the whole issue of 
human rights has finally reached its peak and metamorphosed into a legitimate foreign 
policy objective, competing with other traditional realist interest areas. Just one year later, 
human rights has been ganged down by those traditional realist big brothers and casted 
away into the wildness of U.S. foreign policy. However, as Lake has pointed out, the fo-
cused attention from Beijing to Washington on the issue of human rights will never be 
same again. At the same, they have also recognised that it was far too early to declare a vic-
tory of the Wilsonian idealism in U.S. China policy.
3.4 The Passage of Permanent Normal Trade Relations
There has been a cluster of events since the MFN de-linkage saga that had dramatically 
shaken the U.S.-China relationship. The second half of Clinton’s presidency can be seen as 
a treasure trove for journalists, foreign policy analysts, international relations scholars and 
those who are interested in China policy. Because the variety of incidents occurred during 
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this period covered almost all of the core interest areas in the bilateral relationship ranging 
from security to trade. For the issue of human rights, however, it has been conveniently 
neglected while the United States were tackling with other more critical policy objectives. 
Although it still popped up from time to time in the debates over other policy issues, hu-
man rights have never been able to recover its former glory in the MFN linkage chapter 
and stayed on the margins of Clinton’s China policy for the rest of his presidency. And it is 
not exaggerated to argue that the passage of Permanent Normal Trade Relations with Chi-
na and its pre-determined membership to the World Trade Organisation were the final 
nails in the coffin for the struggle of human rights in U.S.-China relations. Of course, this 
conclusion does not mean that the issue of human rights has simply died out in U.S. China 
policy after the PNTR passage. However, it has completely lost its final string attached to 
the top agendas of U.S. China policy and slipped into the second class if not the third class 
cartridge.
In 1995, pushed by the pro-Taiwan members of Congress, President Clinton allowed the 
Taiwanese leader Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States despite Beijing’s unequivocal op-
position. In response, China had carried out military exercises near the Taiwan Strait and 
recalled China’s ambassador in Washington. Adding to the tensions, the United States had 
sent two aircraft carriers to the strait to demonstrate its commitment to the island. There 
has not been a serious military confrontation between the two countries since the Cold 
War era. Fortunately, after both sides recognised the consequence of mismanagement of 
both side’s policy toward each other, the relationship has been brought back to normal. Af-
ter winning the reelection in 1996, President Clinton met with his Chinese counterpart at 
the Asia Pacific Economic Conference in Manila in the same year and invited President 
Jiang to visit the United States the next year. (Lampton, 2001: 35 and Sutter, 2013: 107-8) 
The Sino-American summits in 1996 and 1997 were the ‘high’ points for the president’s 
China policy. But the success has been quickly shadowed by the 1999 U.S. bombing of the 
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Chinese embassy in Belgrade and Taiwan’s provocation for independence. After a short pe-
riod disruption in the bilateral relationship and with the efforts made by both sides to re-
sume business as usual, the Clinton administration concluded a bittersweet passage of 
PNTR with China in 1999 and reached an agreement with China on its accession to the 
World Trade Organisation.
The battle for PNTR with China was a long and hard one. With the legacy of the debacle of 
MFN linkage policy persisted in American politics, the new Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright argued that the current China policy had become far too narrow, focusing almost 
exclusively on human rights and sacrificing cooperation on crucial problems such as 
weapons proliferation. (Tucker, 2001a: 58) Therefore, a multilevel engagement policy 
should be the primary objective in Clinton’s second term of his president. The peaceful 
resolution of the Taiwan Strait confrontation and Lee’s trip to the United States was the 
result of such engagement policy. However, anti-China sentiment had spread widely in the 
united States, “fuelled by labour unions, the Christian Coalition, and political conservatives 
who labelled China a strategic threat, a human rights violator, and an unethical economic 
rival.” (ibid.) The publication of the book, The Coming Conflict with China, by Richard 
Bernstein and Ross Munro (1998), was a prime representation of this sentiment. Accord-
ing to the book critics in the New York Times, however, this would have been a better book 
if the authors were “focusing less exclusively on rivalry and conflict, and more on the scope 
for achieving mutual accommodation between the two superpowers of the 21st 
century.” (The New York Times, 1997) Indeed, to focus more on achieving a mutual ac-
commodation between the United States and China was the key principle of Clinton’s Chi-
na policy in his second term. As we have discussed earlier in this chapter, apart from 
democracy promotion, economics has always been the  other priority in Clinton’s China 
policy.
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The negotiations on China’s entry into the WTO has been going on for more than a decade. 
The United States took the lead among the WTO’s contracting parties in protracted negoti-
ations (1986-1999) to reach agreements with China on a variety of trade-related issue be-
fore Chinese accession could move forward. (Sutter, 2013: 108) In April 1999, Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rong-ji travelled to Washington to seek a completion of the WTO negotiation 
with United States. In the news conference after the meeting, President Clinton reiterated 
his stance on China’s accession to the WTO by saying that,
“I am also pleased we have made significant progress toward bringing China into the 
World Trade Organisation on fair commercial terms, although we are not quite there yet. 
A fair WTO agreement will go far toward levelling the playing field for our companies 
and our workers in China's markets, will commit China to play by the rules of the in-
ternational trading system, and bring China fully into that system in a way that will 
bring greater opportunity for its citizens and its industries as well…If China is willing to 
play by the global rules of trade, it would be an inexplicable mistake for the United States 
to say no.” (Clinton, 1999)
However, those warm words have not been turned into reality, this time at least. Although 
the White House clearly favoured to proceed the negotiation and hopefully complete it as 
soon as possible, it faced fierce opposition from Congress.The publication of the so-called 
Cox Committee report has significantly damaged the administration’s engagement policy 
with China. The report published by the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and 
Military/Commercial Concerns with People’s Republic of China depicted long-standing 
and widespread Chinese espionage efforts against U.S. nuclear weapons facilities, allowing 
China to build American-designed advanced nuclear warheads for use on Chinese missiles 
that were made more accurate and reliable with the assistance of U.S. companies. (ibid.) 
The China threat card has been played once again. After carefully assessing the situation, 
the Clinton team deemed not to push forward the negotiation in order to avoid further at-
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tacks from Congress. Once the U.S. business community realised how favourable the pack-
age put forward by Premier Zhu during his trip to the U.S. had been, “they castigated the 
administration for shortsightedness.” (Tucker, 2001a: 68) By September, the Clinton team 
calculated it was time to make a second attempt to put the U.S.-China relationship back on 
track. (Garrison, 2005: 152) After meeting with President Jiang at the 1999 APEC summit, 
President Clinton has concluded the U.S.-China negotiation with Premier Zhu when he vis-
ited Washington for the second time in November 1999, paving the way for China’s entry 
into the WTO. (Sutter, 2013: 109) Shortly afterwards, the president has also launched a 
full-scale lobbying efforts in Congress to secure the passage of China’s PNTR status with 
the United States. The administration has assembled a 150-person working group to se-
cure the votes in Congress. (Tucker, 2001a: 68) This was a campaign engineered by Chief 
of Staff John Podesta included the active engagement of cabinet members, with Secretary 
of Commerce William Daley and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Steve Ricchetti leading 
congressional lobbying efforts on China policy. (Garrison, 2005: 152) Unsurprisingly, they 
were met with some resentment from Congress. In opposing to grant China PNTR status 
but not oppose its membership into the WTO, Senator Joseph Biden stated, in front an ex-
tremely lengthy Congressional hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations, that it was 
in America’s interest to deny China’s PNTR status. Senator Biden argued that,
“We agree only to forego an annual vote on China's trade status. An annual threat to 
deny China normal trade relations has never offered us an effective leverage to encour-
age greater Chinese compliance with international norms in the areas of human rights, 
international security, and trade…The question is whether denying permanent trade re-
lations, thereby denying the United States the commercial benefits to China's accession to 
the World Trade Organisation will enhance or decrease our national security. I am of the 
view, at least going into this hearing, that it will enhance it, not diminish it.” (Biden, 
2000)
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White House rejected this seemingly compromising argument. President Clinton has writ-
ten a letter , rather commandingly in fact, to congressional leaders to address the impor-
tance of the passage of PNTR with China. The president argued that it will be a “good deal” 
for the United States and  will promote reform in China and thus “creating a safer world”. 
Clinton concluded that,
“The United States must grant China permanent NTR or risk losing the full benefits of the 
agreement we negotiated, including special import protections, and rights to enforce 
China's commitments through WTO dispute settlement. If Congress were to refuse to 
grant permanent NTR, our Asian and European competitors will reap these benefits but 
American farmers and businesses may well be left behind. In sum, it lies not only in our 
economic interest to grant China permanent NTR status. We must do it to encourage 
China along the path of domestic reform, human rights, the rule of law and international 
cooperation. In the months ahead, I look forward to working with Congress to pass this 
historic legislation.” (Clinton, 2000a)
With this coordinated lobbying efforts pushed by the administration, the legislation of 
PNTR with China has finally passed in the House by a vote of 294-136 and approved by the 
Senate by 83-15. (Congress, 2000) After the victory in the House of Representatives, Pres-
ident Clinton proudly reminded the significance of this legislation to both the United 
States and China. He concluded that,
“This is a good day for America. And 10 years from now we will look back on this day 
and be glad we did this. We will see that we have given ourselves a chance to build the 
kind of future we want. This is a good economic agreement because we get all the eco-
nomic benefits of lowered tariffs and lowered access to the Chinese market. We get new 
protections against dumping of products in our own markets. What we have granted is 
full membership in the World Trade Organisation, which brings China into a rule-based 
international system.” (Clinton, 2000b)
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The passage of PNTR with China bill in the Senate has finally put an end to the contentious 
annual battle between the White House and Congress since George Bush. It has ended the 
need for annual presidential requests and congressional reviews regarding China’s MFN 
trade status in the United States.Despite oppositions from certain members of Congress, 
labour unions, human rights organisations and other activists, this legislation has been 
widely welcomed by the business community, the administration and the Chinese govern-
ment and businesses as well. For the overall U.S.-China relationship, the removal of this 
annual ‘struggle’ over key economic interest was obviously a good thing for the state of the 
bilateral relations. For human rights, it was quite a different story. If you believe in Clin-
ton’s ‘democracy through economic engagement’ argument, the passage was surely a step 
forward in the right direction. As Secretary of State Albright has pointed out in her mem-
oir, through joining the WTO, “China committed to free itself from the ‘House that Mao 
Built’…The millions of Chinese young people who are now learning to think themselves 
economically will almost certainly be more likely than their parents to think for themselves 
politically.” (Albright, 2003: 435) But, if you are not a big fan of the Clinton’s doctrine, you 
may find the Human Rights Watch’s conclusion is much more appealing, that the United 
States has completely lost its leverage over China’s human rights improvements. (quoted 
by Garrison, 2005: 154)
3.5 Conclusion
The issue of human rights has never enjoyed so many spotlights and airtime in the history 
of U.S.-China relations. The debate over China’s human rights has reached almost every 
corner of the American political spectrum and beyond. Clinton’s MFN linkage policy has 
set up the highest connection between human rights and trade interest. This has been, and 
probably will continue to be, the pinnacle of achievement on the status of human rights in 
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U.S. China policy. The passage of China’s PNTR status created an even more far-reaching 
legacy. Unless another cataclysmic event occurs, human rights will almost certainly not be 
linked to the U.S. trade interest with China.
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Chapter Four: The Dissolution of Human Rights, from G.W. Bush to Obama
This final chapter looks at the aftermath left by the Clinton administration and its implica-
tions for human rights in the bilateral relationship between the United States and China. 
Despite conflicting interest in the domestic context, the Bush administration established a 
pragmatic engagement policy toward China and maintained its approach to encouraging 
China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international community. And the Oba-
ma administration has continued this engagement policy after he took office in 2009 and is 
likely to finalise it in this fashion by the end of 2016 as well. As a result, after being in the 
centre stage of the U.S.-China relations for the last two presidencies, the issue of human 
rights has finally been resumed into ad hoc cases and areas.
4.1 Engaging China as a Responsible Stakeholder in International Order un-
der G.W.Bush
After the final battle involved the issue of human rights during the debates over China’s 
Permanent Normal Trade Relations status at the end of Clinton’s presidency, the U.S.-Chi-
na relations has stabilised to the extent that President Clinton even attempted to establish 
a strategic partnership with the Communist government in Beijing. (Garrion, 2005: 156-7) 
This ‘deepening’ process will not go too far under a generally unfriendly domestic political 
environment for China, never mind it was the presidential election year. However, despite 
the negative news coverage and criticisms from pro-human rights members of congress, 
the wider public was generally in favour of the passage of PNTR with China. According to 
Gallup polls, when asked directly about the China trade bill, American public opinion ap-
peared to be coalescing on the side of passage of the agreement. “In the Gallup poll just fin-
ished this weekend, the public approves of the bill by a 56% to 37% margin. This is up from 
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two previous polls conducted this year. In January, the public approved of the measure by 
a 50% to 40% margin, and in an early April poll, the public was split down the 
middle.” (Gallup, 2000) In addition to this favourable opinion, “when given a choice be-
tween two alternative positions on China, Americans were more likely to opt for holding 
back on increased trade with China until the Chinese government promoted more econom-
ic, political and religious freedom for its citizens, rather than the alternative, which argued 
that increased trade would itself promote more freedoms.” (ibid.) 
This bizarre contradiction in public opinion suggested that the American public at the time 
has not established a firm position on China’s human rights practices and its trade rela-
tions with the United States. On the other hand, it also indicated that the rejuvenation of 
human rights debate in U.S. trade relationship with China has some impact on the public 
perception of the whole PNTR issue. In other words, the efforts made by human rights 
sympathisers in Congress, labour unions, human rights organisations and other activists 
during the debate have not vaporised into thin air. However, those developments in Amer-
ican public opinion simply cannot reject the fact that, with the bill signed into law and 
China’s permanent trade status taking effect, the last legal string attached the issue of hu-
man rights to one of the most critical national interest—trade has been severed. Certainly, 
this assertion does not mean that China’s human rights practices have nothing to do with 
its trade relations with the United States. Since China has formally joined the World Trade 
Organisation in 2001, certain regulations regarding workers rights have to be followed. 
But, the political consequence of this ‘cut-off’ has forced the issue of human rights to take a 
backbench seat in America’s policy toward China. Although human rights concerns were 
prominent in rhetorical terms in summit visits, news conference, public speeches and oth-
er demonstrations, it has lost its core connection to the top foreign policy agendas because 
of the passage of PNTR.
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This was the human rights legacy inherited by G.W. Bush. Due to a somewhat ‘dodgy’ vic-
tory in the presidential election over the Democratic candidate Al Gore, Bush did not enjoy 
his early days in office. According to his speechwriter David Frum, “on September 10, 
2001, George Bush was not on his way to a very successful presidency.” (Frum, 2003: 272) 
Like his predecessor’s early days in office, G.W.Bush became president in 2001 with a rep-
utation of toughness toward Chin and the new administration’s approach to Beijing was 
based in large measure on a fundamental uncertainty—“China was rising and becoming 
more prominent in Asia and world affairs, but U.S. leaders were unsure if this process 
would see China emerge as a friend or foe of the United States.” (Sutter, 2013: 123) In an 
attempt to correct what he saw as the weaknesses, vacillations, and failures of the Clinton’s 
China policy, the Bush team sought the development of stronger alliances with democratic 
states in the Asia-Pacific region as a framework for the relationship, rather than focusing 
on a direct, zero-sum relationship with China. (Roberts, 2015: 14-5) This approach has led 
to the Bush administration lower China’s priority for the U.S. decision makers, “placing the 
PRC well behind Japan and other Asian allies and even Russia and India for foreign policy 
attention.” (Sutter, 2013: 124) The management of the April 2001 ‘EP-3’ incident with Chi-
na was a prime example for this downgrade. According to the BBC, nobody really knew 
what has led to a deadly collision between the U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane with a Chinese 
fighter aircraft causing one casualty on the Chinese side and heavy damage on the Ameri-
can aircraft. (BBC, 2000) Initially, the Bush administration kept a low-key response to the 
incident. But, as the 24-man U.S. crew were still held in custody in China, both sides start-
ed to realise that this crisis has to be solved immediately to avoid further escalation. Many 
specialists and analysts “predicted continued deterioration, but both governments worked 
to resolve issues and establish a businesslike relationship that emphasised positive aspects 
of the relationship and played down differences.” (Sutter, 2013: 125) This was a major 
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turning point of Bush’s China policy, which resulted in China’s priority in U.S.foreign poli-
cy been boosted dramatically.
With China’s support of the American people after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York 
and its non-obstructive involvement in the U.S. war on terror, the bilateral relationship 
flourished. Despite continued differences between the U.S. and China in various areas in-
cluding Taiwan and North Korea, by 2003-4, top officials such as Secretary of State Colin 
Powell of the Bush administration publicly claimed that “U.S. relations with China are the 
best they have been since President Nixon's first visit [in 1972].” (People’s Daily, 2003) 
When Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s “responsible stakeholder” argument 
made public, a multilevel engagement policy toward China has been formed within the 
Bush administration. As Zoellick accurately summarised that, “When President Nixon vis-
ited Beijing in 1972, our relationship with China was defined by what we were both against. 
Now we have the opportunity to define our relationship by what are both for.” (Zoellick, 
2005) Although domestic criticism of Bush’s engagement policy began to revive in late 
2005, economic and trade issue dominated has dominated the China policy debate. (Sut-
ter, 2013: 131) Thanks to the Clinton administration’s settlement on China permanent 
normal trade status, the Bush administration and a Democrat-controlled Congress have 
not plunged into a battle melded with trade and human rights, although the congressional 
and media pressure on China’s human rights conditions remained very vocal in their own 
right. And most critics of the administration's overall engagement policy toward China, 
members of Congress, and some interest groups emphasised pursuit of constructive en-
gagement and senior-level dialogues as means to encourage China to behave according to 
U.S.-accepted norms as a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in international politics and thereby 
demonstrated that positives in U.S.-China relations outweighed the negatives. (ibid.)
However, despite this overwhelming consensus on Bush’s engagement policy toward Chi-
na, one particular incident involving China’s human rights record has rejuvenated the top-
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ic in a very public setting, although not as serious as previous cases in G.H.W.Bush and 
Clinton era, it was rhetorically prominent nonetheless. Just before China about to held its 
first Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008, the Democrat presidential hopeful Barack Obama 
and his colleague Hillary Clinton urged President Bush to consider a boycott of the open-
ing of the Beijing Olympics unless China's rights record improves. (BBC, 2008) In a state-
ment made by President Bush in Thailand before he travels to Beijing, he reiterated his po-
sition on China’s human rights:
“The United States believes the people of China deserve the fundamental liberty that is the 
natural right of all human beings. So America stands in firm opposition to China's deten-
tion of political dissidents, human rights advocates, and religious activists. We speak out 
for a free press, freedom of assembly, and labor rights not to antagonise China's leaders, 
but because trusting its people with greater freedom is the only way for China to develop 
its full potential. And we press for openness and justice not to impose our beliefs, but to 
allow the Chinese people to express theirs.” (Bush, 2008) 
Having expressed his concerns on China’s human rights, Bush insisted later that he did not 
need Olympics to advance America’s agenda and will be attending the opening ceremony. 
In an interview with the NBC, Bush once again pushed his engagement policy to the public 
by saying that,
"In the long run, America better remain engaged with China and understand that we can 
have a cooperative and constructive, yet candid, relationship…It’s really important for fu-
ture presidents to understand the relationship between China and the region, and it's im-
portant to make sure that America is engaged with China, even though we may have some 
disagreements.” (CNN, 2008)
Once again, without attaching to key interest areas in U.S.-China relations compounded 
with America’s preoccupation with the war on terror and later on international economic 
meltdown in 2008, human rights pushed whether for personal and partisan political gains 
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or real concerns about human rights abuses cannot outweigh the overall consensus on the 
Bush administration’s approach of engaging China and shaping its policy through the 
venue of bilateral and international politics. As Lampton (2003) has summarised that 
President Bush presided over a U.S.-China relationship closer than ever before and the 
new relationship rested on the war on terror, the binding forces of globalisation, Chinese 
preoccupation with domestic challenges, and Beijing’s growing economic and international 
influence.
4.2 Continued Dissolution of Human Rights Under the Obama Administration
With a cautiously optimistic approach to the U.S.-China relations in the future, Robert Sut-
ter argued that the bilateral relationship had evolved toward a “positive equilibrium” dur-
ing the first decade of the twenty-first century and seemed likely to continue into the near 
future. (Sutter, 2013: 153) Following the usual pattern of a toughening-up on China after 
the transition to a new presidency, the newly elected President Obama was no exception. 
This conflict can even be seen by a minor incident about President Obama’s inauguration 
speech. Watched by millions of Chinese online, those broadcasting websites have censored 
the new U.S. president's “references to communism and dissent, and state television 
abruptly cut away from the live broadcast when communism was mentioned.” (The 
Guardian, 2009) President Obama stated that,
“Recall that earlier generations faced down fascism and communism not just with mis-
siles and tanks, but with the sturdy alliances and enduring convictions.  They understood 
that our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please.  Instead 
they knew that our power grows through its prudent use; our security emanates from the 
justness of our cause, the force of our example, the tempering qualities of humility and 
restraint.” (Obama, 2009)
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Although China has not even been mentioned once in his speech, the Communist govern-
ment in Beijing still found it unacceptable for millions of Chinese to get the message. Non-
etheless, the U.S.-China relations have not suffered from major disruption at the beginning 
of the Obama administration. Because, unlike Clinton or G.W.Bush, President Obama 
came to power facing daunting domestic and foreign crises, namely the continued decline 
of world economies in 2009 and its implications all over the globe. (Sutter, 2013: 161) 
Thus, this overwhelming economic crisis created enough incentives in the new government 
to ensure that the close relationship with China built under President Bush’s second term 
has to be maintained. To recover from this global economic meltdown, the United States 
required close collaboration with other big economies such as China, Japan and the Eu-
ropean Union. In fact, Barack Obama “was unusual in recent U.S. presidential politics in 
not making an issue of his predecessor’s China policy.” (ibid.: 162) Although this statement 
is generally true, Obama did criticise Bush’s China policy if there was an opportunity, such 
as his calling for Bush to boycott the Beijing Olympics we mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, 
the new Obama administration did continue if not enhance Bush’s engagement policy to-
ward China “involving pursuing constructive contacts, preserving and protecting American 
interests, and dealing effectively with challenges posed by rising Chinese influence and 
power.” (ibid.:163) 
Suppressed by the overwhelming consensus for engagement and shared values, the issue of 
human rights continued to dissolve into more specific cases in the margins of Obama’s 
China policy. Two minor cases involving human rights and U.S.-China relations have bee 
widely reported during the Obama administration. One is the case of Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Liu Xiaobo and the other is the asylum case of human rights activist Chen 
Guangcheng in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. Although none of these two cases has brought 
any serious disruption to the U.S.-China relations, both were representations of the disso-
lution of human rights into specific cases in the bilateral relationship.
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On December 10, 2010, an empty chair and a photo had represented Liu Xiaobo, perhaps 
the best-known dissident nowadays, to receive his Nobel Peace Prize from the Norwegian 
Nobel Committee in Oslo. The chairman Thorjorn Jagland remarked that this very fact of 
his absence in the ceremony shows that, “the award was necessary and appropriate”. Liu 
has been awarded for his “long and nonviolent struggle for fundamental human rights in 
China”. (The Nobel Prize website, 2010) Despite China’s furious opposition and aggressive 
lobbying on other states to boycott the award, more than 1000 V.I.P.s attended the cere-
mony in their support for Mr. Liu. On the day of the announcement of the award, the US 
government praised the decision and called the Chinese government to release Mr. Liu as 
soon as possible. President Obama has made a statement to welcome the Committee’s de-
cision to award Mr. Liu the Peace Prize which the President himself also received a year 
ago. The President noted that, although China has made ‘dramatic progress’ in economic 
reform, “this award reminds us that political has not kept in pace, and that the basic hu-
man rights of every man, woman and child must be respected.” (Obama, 2010) On the 
same day, in line with the President, Secretary of State Clinton also applauded the Award 
and urged China to uphold its international human rights obligations and called for Mr. 
Liu’s immediate release from prison. (Clinton, 2010) In the U.S. Congress (2010), a resolu-
tion of ‘Congratulating Liu Xiaobo on Nobel Peace Prize’ has been introduced by Rep. 
Christopher Smith and later passed by an overall majority of 402 to 1 in the House of Rep-
resentatives on December 8. The resolution not only congratulated Mr. Liu and called for 
his release, but also urged the Chinese government to cease its media censorship and its 
prosecutions of other dissidents. (ibid) At this point, a united front has been forged within 
the US government in responding to Liu’s case. However the roles played by various levels 
of the US government were slightly different.
Although the case of Mr. Liu’s mistreatment has long been alerted in successive reports 
published by the State Department and congressional committees, the case of his Nobel 
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Prize Award was ultimately not a U.S.-China emergency. The impact of Chinese govern-
ment’s repercussions has primarily been felt by the Norwegian government, which has 
been perceived by Beijing as the primary party responsible for the international embar-
rassment caused. (The Financial Times, 2012) Thus, much of China’s diplomatic resources 
have been devoted in snubbing Oslo for crossing Beijing ‘policy red lines’. (Bloomberg, 
2012) By recognising this situation and the uniqueness of Liu’s case, the Obama adminis-
tration concluded that it can stand together with Congress in pressing on Beijing without 
worrying too much about its detrimental impact on the bilateral relationship.
In an attempt to compensate the damage caused by the administration’s initial ‘soft’ ap-
proach on China’s human rights, Clinton’s remarks on the subject of human rights, espe-
cially Beijing’s mistreatment of dissidents and crackdowns on civil societies, became much 
tougher and more explicit each time since her 2009 Seoul speech. Secretary Clinton specif-
ically named Mr. Liu’s case of an 11-year sentence in her lengthy speech in Krakow, Poland, 
just a few months before the Nobel award announcement. (Clinton, 2010) Three months 
later when the announcement came out from Oslo, the Administration arrived at a rela-
tively comfortable position in ‘talking tough’ with the Chinese government in Liu’s case.
The machine of the US Congress has literally functioned full-time after Mr. Liu’s award. 
Members of the House expressed their sense both collectively by supporting two resolu-
tions, and individually by making short statements. Waves of congressional hearings were 
also called by various subcommittees of the House prior and after Liu’s Nobel award. A 
congressional hearing on ‘Nobel Laureate Liu Xiaobo and the Future of Political Reform in 
China’ has been held immediately after the announcement of the award. In the opening 
statement, cochairman of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Rep. Sander 
Levin noted that, with the mistreatment of Mr.Liu, “China once again is at an important 
crossroad and seems to be turning in the wrong direction.” (2010: 1) Such observation has 
been agreed by all selected witnesses, although the degree of pessimism in their arguments 
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on China’s political reform varies. Therefore, the conclusions of the hearing are not sur-
prising and consistent with the sense of the Congress (expressed in H.Con.Res.151): the 
Chinese government should release Mr. Liu immediately, and the prospect of China’s polit-
ical reform, such as the vision hinted by the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s interview with 
CNN, is grim. Soon after this congressional hearing, another briefing was held by the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs just after the new year 2011. Although the briefing’s topic is 
on “Assessing China’s Behaviour and Its Impact on US Interests”, the main focus of the 
panelists and House members is more or less on China’s poor human rights conditions. 
(Congress 2011a) This briefing was quickly followed by a roundtable hearing before the 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China on the subject of “Current Conditions for 
Human Rights Defenders and Lawyers in China, and Implications for US Policy”. (Con-
gress 2011b) Unsurprisingly, the Chinese government’s tactics of treating human rights ac-
tivists were heavily condemned by the participants of the hearing.
From the face of the emergent case of Liu’s Nobel Prize Award, it was clear that both the 
executive branch and Congress have held same ground in condemning the Chinese gov-
ernment and calling for Liu’s immediate release. However, no concrete actions have been 
taken by both the Administration and Congress to press on Beijing for Liu’s release. Fur-
ther, differences in this united front of defending human rights values can also be ob-
served. For the United States government as a whole, its major foreign policy objective to-
wards China is to maintain a stable bilateral relationship. It is not only beneficial for the 
American strategic, economic, cultural and other interests but also crucial to the US allies 
in the Asia-Pacific region and friends worldwide. Since the case of Mr. Liu’s Nobel Prize 
Award was provoked by neither side and considering China’s confrontational assertiveness 
on the issue, the US government’s choice of verbal condemnations on Beijing’s mistreat-
ment and to avoid unnecessary confrontation was proportionate. And it has been especial-
ly so when the US will receive the Chinese President’s formal visit a few months after the 
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incident. Therefore, President Obama issued a carefully balanced statement of recognising 
China’s achievement, on the one hand, and calling for Mr. Liu’s release on the other.
As being the traditional critique on China issues, Congress has always been at the forefront 
of the fighting against the oppressive regime of the People’s Republic. Despite the lack of 
real actions from the executive branch, the U.S. Congress passed two resolutions directly 
addressing Liu Xiaobo’s case. With an absolute majority in the vote of the resolutions, the 
congressmen and congresswomen held their ground firmly and offered their support for 
Liu’s award. By setting up waves of congressional hearings on China’s human rights prac-
tices afterwards, the message from the Congress was made quite clear to both the Adminis-
tration and the public: it was not just about their fury on Beijing’s treatment of Mr. Liu and 
his family, but more generally about their objections to the existence of the current Chi-
nese regime. As Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen once defined China in a briefing 
hearing as a country “led by a cynical group of leaders who, sobered by the Tiananmen 
massacre and marked by the blood of its victims, were determined to go forward with eco-
nomic but not political change.” (Congress, 2011: 1a) Further, she concluded that China 
has fallen far short of the benign image of a ‘responsible stakeholder’ envisaged by the 
former Deputy Secretory of State Zoellick. Unlike President Obama’s statement, Congress 
did not waste their words on praising China for its economic achievement, and certainly 
did not hesitate to explicitly criticise China’s behaviour on Liu’s case. It was not new for 
Congress to assert itself on issues of China’s human rights. By exploiting the case of Liu’s 
Nobel Prize, Congress has kept the Obama Administration in check in terms of its dealings 
with China and maintained the issue of human rights top in the American political agenda 
even after President Hu’s visit to the US 2011. In general, the US government’s reactions to 
Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize Award were proportionate and balanced. Although it may disap-
point many in Beijing who dreamed about a relationship of ‘principled pragmatism’ with 
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the US even in the area of human rights, a reaction of calling for Liu’s release from the US 
side certainly did not surprise the Chinese government. 
On the eve of the annual US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue took place in Beijing 
2012, the 40-year-old blind human rights activist Chen Guangcheng escaped from the au-
thority’s captivity and arrived at the US Beijing Embassy to seek ‘asylum’.(State Depart-
ment website, 2012) Although the case of Chen Guangcheng has been noted in previous 
governments reports including the State Department’s Country Report, his sudden arrival 
at the Beijing Embassy intensified the atmosphere on both sides of the Pacific at a time 
when both were going to experience a big change in a few months time. In an interview 
taken after his arrival at the US embassy, Chen expressed his desire to travel to the US by 
Secretory Clinton’s flight together with his family. (The Guardian, 2012) A few days later, 
on May 20, 2012, Chen and his family arrived at the Newark International Airport, New 
Jersey. At this moment, the diplomatic tussle caused by Chen’s asylum has drawn to a 
temporary end, and the contingent alert has been relieved in the U.S.-China relationship. 
Unlike the case of Liu Xiaobo, President Obama issued no official statement on the inci-
dent of Chen’s asylum. In a joint press conference with the Japanese Prime Minister Noda, 
President Obama answered the question on Chen’s case by reiterating his government’s 
position that he believes China will be stronger as it opens up and liberalises its own sys-
tem. (Obama, 2012) The difficult task of responding to the public has been passed to the 
State Department. The State Department acted in a typical diplomatic way. At first, it re-
fused to leak any information to  the mass media. From Washington to Beijing, from the 
State Department’s spokesperson Ms. Nuland to the Ambassador Gary Locke, the whole 
Department coordinated its reactions very carefully. Only when everything was widely re-
ported in major news agencies, the State Department held a press briefing in Beijing with 
the attendance of two senior State Department officials who have involved in the case. 
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(State Department, 2012) Soon afterwards, Ambassador Locke and Secretory Clinton re-
ceived waves of media interviews and both have held their tongues firmly on the issue.
Surprisingly, Congress did not respond to Chen’s case in any form of resolution. Although 
Rep. Smith introduced a formal resolution to the House in 2010 calling for Chen’s release, 
nothing has been introduced in 2012. The only formal reaction visible was a congressional 
hearing has been convened before the Executive-Congressional Commission on China. 
(Executive-Congressional Commission on China website, 2012)
Unlike Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize Award, the case of Chen’s ‘asylum’ to the US Beijing em-
bassy was a diplomatic tussle affects both the US and China. It happened at a very delicate 
time when both countries were going through a future change of government. Thus, the 
incident has to be dealt with utmost care. By recognising the sensitivity of the case, the US 
government reacted proportionately with no attempt to further exploit the case to press on 
China. By putting an emphasis on Chen’s will to travel to the US, Washington avoided the 
criticism of manipulating the case for its own purpose. The State Department was the only 
bureaucratic branch involved. By skilfully handling the case and cooperating with the Chi-
nese authority, its prominent position in advocating human rights in US-China relation-
ship has been reinforced. With Chen’s safe landing in the US, Congress has perceived that 
there was no need to further exploit the case. Since the 2012 general election was ap-
proaching, there were many other crucial issues for members of Congress to concentrate 
on. Electoral factors might be the main cause of such lack of interest. Thus, Chen’s case re-
flects Obama’s pragmatic approach in his government’s dealings with China on human 
rights issues.
4.3 Conclusion
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There should be no surprise to see the issue of human rights has dissolved into individual 
minor cases on the margins of U.S.-China relations since the passage of PNTR status to 
China at the end of Clinton’s presidency. On the one hand, as the cooperations in the bilat-
eral relationship multiply year by year, there are far more areas for leaders in Washington 
and Beijing to focus on compared with the previous generation. On the other hand, as Chi-
na’s involvement in the international community increases, the battle over its human 
rights record is not just confined to the bilateral relationship but other multinational and 
supranational organisations as well. The general policy of pragmatic engagement, sta-
bilised by Bush and continued by Obama, has been proven to be the most effective ap-
proach to managing the ever more complex U.S.-China relations. And for the issue of hu-
man rights, although still prominent in rhetoric, will continue to be dissolved into specific 
areas in the foreseeable future
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Conclusion 
This research aims to explore the evolution of human rights in U.S.-China relations since 
the end of Cold War. By adopting process tracing method, it carefully examines four U.S. 
administration’s human rights policy towards China to make comprehensive descriptions 
and observations. First chapter lays the ground for the historic analysis of the evolution of 
human rights in U.S.-China relations since the Cold War. Second chapter focuses on the 
G.H.W.Bush administration’s management of the bilateral relationship after the terrible 
incident of 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. The third part analyses in detail the full story of 
the debacle of the linkage between China’s Most-Favoured-Nation status and its human 
rights conditions and the subsequent passage of Permanent Normal Trade Relations status 
for China. The final chapter focuses on the continuous process of dissolution of human 
rights under the two most recent presidencies, G.W.Bush and Obama. By identifying key 
causal process observations from each administration mentioned above, i.e. the Tianan-
men event and the MFN case, we can conclude that, the dissolution of human rights issues 
comes hand in hand with its diminishing presence in key diplomatic areas in U.S.-China 
relations since the Clinton era. Human rights had it prominence during G.H.W. Bush and 
Clinton administration as indicated by the two influential events—1989 Tiananmen Crack-
down and China’s MFN status debate. 
The strength of this research lies within the consistent and inclusive scope of analysis of 
the four U.S. administrations after the Cold War. It contributed to the realm of U.S.-China 
relations as a research dedicated to human rights aspect of the bilateral relationship after 
the Cold War. It has also benefited with the unwavering focus on the issue of human rights 
in U.S.-China relations. However, the constant focus on human rights can also be a major 
weakness of this research. As mentioned in the literature review, due to its complexity in 
concept, human rights has been taken as a collective entity of widely rights in this research. 
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But human rights itself is a multi-faceted and highly debated concept in the academic. 
Thus, the research question should be analysed in a more comprehensive manner. Second-
ly, this research can greatly benefited from some supplements of comparative cases stud-
ies. Although U.S.-China relations is crucial to both sides and the world, how does human 
rights issue evolve in U.S. relations with other nations for example? The conclusions of 
those comparative studies could be key support evidence to this research’s claim and par-
ticularly useful in making further arguments on the future development of human rights in 
U.S. foreign policy in general. 
In his remarks on the passage of China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations status, Presi-
dent Clinton concluded that the most significant achievement of that legislation was hope. 
In his words, “I have said many times, and I'd just like to say once more, to me, the most 
important benefit of all is that we have given ourselves and the Chinese a chance—not a 
guarantee but a chance—to build a future in the Asia-Pacific region for the next 50 years 
very different from the last 50.” (Clinton, 2000b) Now, at the time of writing this paper, 
more than a decade has passed since the legislation has been approved by the Senate. Chi-
na’s economy has grown into the second place in the world and is predicted to surpass the 
United States in the near future. (Forbes, 2016) The cooperations between the U.S. and 
China have multiplied into an ever-expanding web pulling the two nations ever closer than 
before. Despite Beijing’s attempt to control its citizens access to the wider world, with the 
continuous growth in personal income and wealth, more and more Chinese have been in-
tegrated into the international community passively or proactively. One prominent exam-
ple was the number of Chinese tourist travelled abroad. According to the Reuters, a record-
breaking $215 billion was spent by Chinese travellers abroad last year, 53 percent more 
than a year earlier. (The Reuters, 2016) Most interestingly, even the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election has been closely followed by millions of Chinese online. (The Atlantic, 2016) So 
what do those developments tell us about human rights in U.S.-China relations? None of 
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those developments directly linked to the issue of human rights. However, with a second 
look, you may realise that those Chinese people have more things in common with the 
West than with their older generations. If the U.S. presidential election campaign can 
overcome the Great Firewall censorship of the Communist government, the humble ideol-
ogy of human rights certainly can slip through it as well. Thanks to the successive adminis-
trations’ efforts to no isolate China, the Middle Kingdom has become more open than ever 
before, although it is case for the ruling Communist Party. There is an ancient Chinese say-
ing, “once the water has been poured onto the ground, there is no way to have it undone.” 
Once China has been opened to the world, there is way to close it up again. In this context, 
the seeds of human rights will germinate and President Clinton’s hope will not be mis-
placed. 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